Automated Summary
Key Facts
Plaintiff Gail Willis, proceeding pro se, filed a lawsuit against AFFINIA DEFAULT SERVICES, LLC and others alleging unlawful non-judicial foreclosure of real property at 2015 Buckingham Road, Los Angeles, California. Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. moved to dismiss Willis's Complaint. The Court granted Wells Fargo's Motion to Dismiss because Willis lacks standing to bring the claims. Willis claimed to be the daughter and intended third party beneficiary of a loan agreement and executor of Henrietta Willis' Estate. However, the Deed of Trust identified "Henrietta E Willis, Trustee of the Henrietta E Willis Revocable Living Trust" as the sole borrower and signatory. The Court found Willis was neither a party to the loan nor a record owner of the Subject Property. Willis has until September 5, 2019, to file an amended complaint.
Transaction Type
Mortgage foreclosure dispute involving loan and Deed of Trust
Issues
- The court addressed whether Gail Willis has standing to bring claims related to the non-judicial foreclosure sale of the Subject Property. The court found that standing requires the plaintiff to be a party to the mortgage loan or have an interest in the property, which Willis neither was. The recorded Deed of Trust lists Henrietta E. Willis, Trustee of the Henrietta E. Willis Revocable Living Trust as the sole borrower and signatory, demonstrating conclusively that Willis is not the borrower on the loan and has no interest in the loan or the Subject Property.
- The court considered whether to grant Willis leave to amend her complaint after dismissing it. Despite her pro se status, the court found leave to amend proper but noted her amended complaint must address the standing deficiency as discussed in the Order.
Holdings
The Court GRANTS Wells Fargo's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Gail Willis's Complaint because she lacks standing to bring the foreclosure claims. Willis was neither a party to the loan nor a record owner of the Subject Property at 2015 Buckingham Road, Los Angeles, California. The Court finds that only a borrower or their assignee may bring claims based on the underlying mortgage, and Willis does not identify how she obtained title to the property. The Court also grants Willis leave to amend her complaint with a deadline of September 5, 2019.
Remedies
- The Court GRANTS Wells Fargo's Motion to Dismiss Willis's Complaint. Willis shall have up to and including September 5, 2019, to file her amended complaint.
- Willis was granted leave to amend her complaint, with a deadline of September 5, 2019, to file the amended complaint.
Legal Principles
The court applied Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal standards requiring that factual allegations be sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. The court also applied standing requirements under Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, requiring injury in fact, causation, and redressability. Additionally, the court considered the incorporation by reference doctrine and judicial notice standards for public documents.
Precedent Name
- Grant v. Aurora Loan Servs., Inc.
- Warth v. Seldin
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly
- Pena v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins
- Bianchi v. Bank of Am., N.A.
- Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't
Cited Statute
- Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
- Federal Rules of Evidence
Judge Name
Otis D. Wright II
Passage Text
- The Court finds that Willis lacks standing to bring the claims asserted, and therefore does not reach Wells Fargo's remaining arguments.
- The recorded Deed of Trust lists 'Henrietta E Willis, Trustee of the Henrietta E Willis Revocable Living Trust' as the sole borrower and signatory. The Deed of Trust and related documents demonstrate conclusively that Willis is not the borrower on the loan and has no interest in the loan or the Subject Property.
- Standing requires that: (1) the plaintiff has suffered an injury in fact, i.e., 'an invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical'; (2) the injury is 'fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant'; and (3) the injury is 'likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.'