Benedict Maina Warutere v Mary Wambere Ngetha & another [2017] eKLR

Kenya Law

Automated Summary

Key Facts

The case involves Benedict Maina Warutere challenging the Land Disputes Tribunal's 2007 decision favoring Mary Wambere Ngetha and Grace Nyambura Ngetha (deceased), which ordered the cancellation of his land title for Laikipia Ngobit/Muhonia Block 1/21. The applicant appealed to the Provincial Appeals Committee, but the committee was abolished before the appeal could be heard. He then sought judicial review to quash the Tribunal and court proceedings, arguing jurisdictional issues. The court found the appeal became a High Court matter post-repeal and dismissed the application as time-barred and unfounded.

Issues

  • The court dismissed the application to quash a non-existent award. The Tribunal's award had already been adopted as a court judgment, making the certiorari application moot. The court emphasized that the applicant's recourse was to appeal to the High Court rather than seek judicial review.
  • The court evaluated the application for a prohibition order, which was brought more than 8 years after the decision. The law requires such applications to be made without undue delay. The court was not satisfied with the lack of explanation for the delay and thus denied the application.
  • The court considered whether the repeal of the Land Disputes Tribunals Act rendered the Tribunal's proceedings and the subsequent appeal invalid. The applicant argued that the repeal made the appeal useless, but the court held that the award had already been adopted as a court judgment, and thus the repeal did not affect its enforceability. The court referenced Section 23 of the Interpretation and General Provisions Act, which states that repeal does not affect existing legal proceedings, and the case of Chege Macharia v. Francis Kimani Kirimira to support this view.
  • The court determined that the application for certiorari was time-barred under the 6-month rule. The decision sought to be quashed was made on 21st November 2007, and the application for leave was filed in 2015, over 7 years later. The court found that this exceeded the 6-month period stipulated by law, rendering the application ineligible for leave.

Holdings

  • The court found the applicant's argument regarding the repeal of the Land Disputes Tribunals Act was based on a misapprehension of law. It referenced the case of Chege Macharia v. Francis Kimani Kirimira (2015) eKLR, affirming that the Act's repeal did not invalidate the appeal process.
  • The court dismissed the application for leave to apply for judicial review orders, concluding the applicant failed to establish a valid case for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition. The court emphasized that the Land Disputes Tribunal's award had been adopted as a court judgment and was not nullified by the Act's repeal.

Remedies

The application for chamber summons is dismissed with costs.

Legal Principles

The court applied the principle that the repeal of the Land Disputes Tribunals Act did not render prior legal proceedings or judgments null and void. Section 23(3)(e) of the Interpretation and General Provisions Act (Cap 2) was cited, which states that the repeal of a law does not affect existing legal proceedings or remedies. The judgment emphasized that such proceedings must be concluded as if the repealing law had not been enacted, aligning with constitutional requirements for timely justice under Article 159.

Precedent Name

Chege Macharia v. Francis Kimani Kirimira

Cited Statute

  • Constitution of Kenya, Article 159
  • Land Disputes Tribunal Act
  • Land Act CAP 6
  • Land Registration Act CAP 3
  • Interpretation and General Provisions Act, Cap 2

Judge Name

L. Waithaka

Passage Text

  • “We are of the considered view that where, as in this case an award had been properly forwarded by the Chairman of the Tribunal but was not yet read when the Act was repealed, the proper course would have been for the magistrate to adopt the award and read it as a judgment of the court to be followed by the usual process of decree and execution and appeal where parties so desire. Such appeals would be to the High Court by dint of clause 13 of the practice direction, the Provincial Appeals Committee also having met their quietus with the repeal of the Act.”
  • “Applying the aforesaid ruling to the circumstances of this case, I find that the applicant has not made up a case for being granted leave to apply for judicial review orders and I dismiss the application for chamber summons with costs.”
  • “Such a course of action is inescapable from a proper reading of the Practice Direction as framed and also accords with the doing of justice in a timely, efficient and cost effective manner as commanded by Article 159 of the Constitution and the Practice Direction itself.”