James Benbow V Police Officer Brian Feeley Police Officer Matthew

Key Facts

Issues

• Benbow moved to preclude defendants from introducing his guilty-plea allocution transcript from the underlying criminal case. The court denied the motion, finding no basis under Federal Rules of Evidence and noting the transcript had already appeared on the public docket.
• Defendants sought to bifurcate the trial into separate liability and damages phases. The court granted this motion, determining that bifurcation would serve judicial efficiency given multiple witnesses whose testimony would relate primarily or solely to damages.
• Benbow moved to exclude defendants' expert George G. Krivosta's testimony. The court granted in part, precluding testimony predicated on hearsay (weapon possession, jacket status), beyond expert scope (police tactics, psychology), or involving factual recitation. The court reserved judgment on certain trajectory conclusions pending clarification from defendants.
• The court addressed whether to exclude the testimony of multiple experts proffered by the parties. For defendants' experts (Pollini, Drukteinis, Ryan, Molinaro, Caron, Gardere), the court granted in part and denied in part the motion to exclude, permitting testimony on crime scene reconstruction, physical injuries, and psychological impact while excluding opinions beyond expert expertise or based on impermissible evidence. For plaintiff's expert Krivosta, the court granted in part the motion to exclude, precluding testimony predicated on hearsay, beyond expert scope, or involving factual recitation, while permitting certain trajectory and bullet wound location testimony.
• Defendants argued judicial estoppel should prevent Benbow from testifying he did not possess a firearm at the time of the shooting, based on his plea allocution. The court rejected this, finding judicial estoppel requires both an inconsistent prior position adopted by a tribunal and a favorable judgment, neither clearly met here given the plea was vacated on appeal.

Holdings

• The Court granted Defendants' motion to bifurcate the trial into liability and damages phases to serve judicial efficiency given multiple witnesses whose testimony relates primarily or solely to damages. The Court denied Benbow's motion to preclude defendants from introducing the transcript of his guilty-plea allocution as he cited no basis for exclusion under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Court held that judicial estoppel does not apply, permitting Benbow to testify and argue he did not possess a firearm, though testimony regarding the underlying criminal action's legal issues will not be admitted. The Court granted in part and denied in part the motion to exclude Benbow's experts, permitting testimony on crime scene reconstruction, physical injuries, and psychological impact while excluding certain expert opinions. The Court granted in part Benbow's motion to exclude defendant Krivosta's testimony, precluding certain hearsay-based opinions while allowing other testimony with adequate foundation.
• The Court granted Defendants' motion to bifurcate the trial into liability and damages phases for judicial efficiency. The Court denied Benbow's motion to preclude defendants from introducing the transcript of his guilty-plea allocution as he cited no basis for exclusion under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Court held that judicial estoppel does not apply, permitting Benbow to testify and argue he did not possess a firearm, though testimony regarding the underlying criminal action's legal issues will not be admitted. The Court granted in part and denied in part the motion to exclude Benbow's experts, permitting testimony on crime scene reconstruction, physical injuries, and psychological impact while excluding certain expert opinions. The Court granted in part Benbow's motion to exclude defendant Krivosta's testimony, precluding certain hearsay-based opinions while allowing other testimony with adequate foundation.

Remedies

• The Court resolved multiple motions to exclude expert testimony. Defendants' motion to exclude Pollini, Drukteinis, Ryan, Molinaro, Caron, and Gardere was granted in part and denied in part. Benbow's motion to exclude Krivosta was also granted in part. Specific testimony was permitted while other testimony was excluded based on expertise, methodology, and hearsay concerns.
• The Court denied Defendants' motion to judicially estop Benbow from testifying he did not possess a firearm. Benbow will be permitted to testify and argue that he did not possess a firearm at the time of the shooting incident, but the Court will not admit testimony or argument regarding legal issues or determinations rendered on appeal in the underlying criminal action.
• The Court granted Defendants' motion to bifurcate the trial into liability and damages phases. This serves the interest of judicial efficiency given multiple witnesses whose proposed testimony will relate primarily or solely to damages.

Legal Principles

• Judicial estoppel requires two prongs: (i) the party against whom estoppel is asserted took an inconsistent position in a prior proceeding, and (ii) that position was adopted by the first tribunal in some manner, such as by rendering a favorable judgment. In this case, the court found neither prong clearly met because the plea allocution contained residual ambiguity and was ultimately vacated on appeal.
• The court applied Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403 to exclude expert testimony that would lead to confusion or be irrelevant. Under Fed. R. Evid. 803(4), statements made to experts for medical diagnosis are admissible, but experts cannot simply transmit hearsay to the jury. Expert opinions must be based on the expert's own methodology and experience, not on inadmissible evidence or factual recitation. Testimony about a party's state of mind is also excluded.

Precedent Name

• United States v. Bilzerian
• United States v. Mejia
• In re Namenda Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig.
• Smith v. Arizona
• Clark v. AII Acquisition, LLC
• United States v. Amuso

Cited Statute

• New York Criminal Procedure Law
• Federal Rules of Evidence

Judge Name

Passage Text

• Bifurcation (Defendants). Defendants seek to bifurcate the trial into liability and damages phases. That motion is granted. Bifurcation will serve the interest of judicial efficiency in this case, given the multiple witnesses whose proposed testimony will relate primarily or solely to damages.
• Joseph A. Pollini. Defendants' motion to exclude Mr. Pollini is granted. Mr. Pollini offers three main conclusions: (1) defendants used excessive force; (2) defendants' use of force violated New York City Police Department (NYPD) policy and procedures; and (3) the NYPD failed to properly monitor, supervise, and discipline their officers. ECF No. 174-1, at 9-10. The first conclusion regards the ultimate legal issue in this case and is clearly impermissible. United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1295 (2d Cir. 1991). The last conclusion is irrelevant and likely to lead to confusion under Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403, as this Court already dismissed Benbow's Monell claim. See ECF No. 122. Finally, while defendants' failure to comply with NYPD policy and procedures is arguably relevant, Mr. Pollini's curriculum vitae reveals no expertise in that field. His testimony is therefore excluded.
• Judicial estoppel requires '(i) that the party against whom the estoppel is asserted took an inconsistent position in a prior proceeding and (ii) that that position was adopted by the first tribunal in some manner, such as by rendering a favorable judgment.' Clark v. AII Acquisition, LLC, 886 F.3d 261, 266 (2d Cir. 2018). Neither prong is clearly met here. The portion of Benbow's plea allocution that defendants reference in their motion, ECF No. 150-1, at 13, contains at least some residual ambiguity. And Benbow's plea, while accepted by the trial court, was ultimately vacated on appeal. Benbow will be permitted to testify and argue that he did not possess a firearm. However, the Court will not admit testimony or argument regarding the legal issues or the determination rendered on appeal in the underlying criminal action.