Automated Summary
Key Facts
Earnest Lee Braziel was arrested at his grandparents' home by Dade County Sheriff's officers to serve a felony warrant. During the arrest, Braziel head-butted a deputy and yelled commands to his pit bull. The dog attacked the deputy, locking its jaws on the officer's leg. Braziel was convicted of aggravated assault on a peace officer, among other charges, and appealed claiming insufficient evidence to support the conviction.
Issues
- Braziel challenged whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction for aggravated assault on a peace officer, specifically regarding the dog attack. He contended that the evidence did not show he caused the dog to attack the officer and that other factors, including other officers, patrol cars, and a K-9 dog at the scene could have provoked the dog to attack the officer. The court found the evidence sufficient to authorize the jury's finding that appellant was guilty of aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer beyond a reasonable doubt.
- Braziel contended that the trial court erred in its instruction to the jury that the aggravated assault could be committed in a way not specified in the indictment. The court reviewed the charge and found it properly instructed the jury on the aggravated assault statute and addressed the specific instrument of assault alleged in the indictment. The court held that the trial court did not authorize a conviction in a manner not alleged in the indictment.
Holdings
The Court of Appeals of Georgia affirmed the conviction for aggravated assault on a peace officer, finding the evidence sufficient to support the jury's verdict that appellant commanded his pit bull to attack the deputy during arrest. The court also determined there was no error in the jury instruction as it properly tracked the statutory language of aggravated assault and addressed the specific instrument alleged in the indictment.
Remedies
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, upholding the convictions for aggravated assault on a peace officer, simple battery, possession of alprazolam, possession of marijuana, and crossing the guard line of a correctional institution with drugs.
Legal Principles
- A person commits aggravated assault when they assault with a deadly weapon or any object, device or instrument which when used offensively against a person is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury. The use of a dog can be considered a deadly weapon. The trial court properly instructed the jury that a dog may or may not be a deadly weapon depending on the manner of use and circumstances.
- When reviewing sufficiency of evidence after conviction, courts view evidence in light most favorable to jury's verdict and determine only if evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The use of a dog can be considered a deadly weapon under OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2). Jury instructions must track the indictment and cannot authorize conviction in a manner not alleged in the indictment.
Precedent Name
- Blige v. State
- Powell v. State
- Perkins v. State
- Pettway v. State
- Michael v. State
Cited Statute
- OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2)
- OCGA §§ 16-13-28 (a) (1); 16-13-30 (a)
Judge Name
- Judge Barnes
- Judge McMillian
- Judge McFadden
Passage Text
- Moreover, we 'do not weigh the evidence or determine witness credibility, but only determine if the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt.'(Footnote omitted). Id.
- The officer who was assaulted testified that Braziel yelled to his dog 'sic him boy, bite him' before the dog attacked the officer. Another deputy testified that the dog had been aggressive in past encounters at Braziel's home, but that 'Braziel ha[d] usually called it off.' Despite Braziel's contentions otherwise, this evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury's finding that appellant was guilty of aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer beyond a reasonable doubt.
- In this case, however, contrary to Braziel's contention that the instruction permitted the jury to convict him of a crime not charged in the indictment, the charge tracked the assault language of OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2), under which Braziel was indicted, and addressed the specific instrument of the assault that was alleged in the indictment, assault with 'a dog, an instrument which when used offensively against a person is likely to result in serious bodily injury.'