Automated Summary
Key Facts
Calvin Washington was convicted of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) in 2022 after pleading guilty. His criminal history includes multiple juvenile and adult offenses, such as theft, robbery, assault, illegal firearm possession, drug possession, and probation violations, resulting in a criminal history score of 25. Washington filed a § 2255 motion arguing his conviction was unconstitutional under the 2nd Amendment and alleging ineffective counsel for not filing an appeal. The court denied the motion, concluding the claim was procedurally defaulted and that § 922(g)(1) is facially constitutional. Washington later withdrew his ineffective counsel claim after a hearing.
Issues
- The petitioner initially claimed ineffective assistance of counsel for not filing a notice of appeal after his 15-day sentencing period. However, he later withdrew this claim during a hearing. The court noted that even if the claim had been pursued, it would have failed due to the petitioner’s explicit waiver of appeal rights in his plea agreement and his lack of demonstrated prejudice.
- The court determined that the petitioner’s constitutional challenge to § 922(g)(1) was procedurally defaulted because it was first raised in his § 2255 motion, not in the trial court or on direct appeal. This default barred review unless he showed cause and prejudice or actual innocence, which he did not.
- The petitioner challenged the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) under the Second Amendment, citing cases like New York Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen and Range v. Att'y Gen. United States. The court concluded that the statute is facially constitutional, aligning with its analysis in United States v. Reed, and found the claim procedurally defaulted due to untimely raising it post-conviction.
Holdings
- The court rejected the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to raise the constitutional challenge to §922(g)(1), noting the challenge was not timely and counsel's performance met reasonable standards. The petitioner did not demonstrate deficient performance or prejudice, as the law at the time of the plea did not support the argument and counsel had no obligation to anticipate the Bruen decision.
- The court denied the petitioner's claim that 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1) is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, finding it procedurally defaulted as it was not raised before the guilty plea or on direct appeal. The court concluded that the statute is facially constitutional under the historical tradition analysis established in Bruen and Rahimi, and the petitioner's extensive criminal history supports its application to him.
Remedies
- For the reasons explained in this Order, Calvin Washington's motion for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 must be denied and the action dismissed with prejudice. In addition, the Court finds that a certificate of appealability should not issue.
- The Court denies a certificate of appealability, finding that Mr. Washington has not demonstrated that reasonable jurists would debate the validity of his constitutional claim or the procedural correctness of the ruling.
- The Court orders that the motion to vacate (Crim. Dkt. 79) shall be terminated in the underlying criminal action.
Legal Principles
- The court referenced the Strickland v. Washington standard for ineffective assistance of counsel, requiring a petitioner to show (1) counsel's performance fell below objective standards and (2) this deficiency prejudiced the defense. The court concluded trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1).
- The court applied the procedural default doctrine, holding that constitutional claims raised for the first time on collateral review are barred unless the petitioner demonstrates actual innocence or satisfies the 'cause and prejudice' standard. This was based on Delatorre v. United States and Bousley v. United States.
Precedent Name
- Bousley v. United States
- New York Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen
- United States v. Rahimi
- Delatorre v. United States
- United States v. Gay
- Strickland v. Washington
- Range v. Att'y Gen. United States
- Bridges v. United States
Cited Statute
- 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
- 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)
- 28 U.S.C. § 2255
Judge Name
Sarah Evans Barker
Passage Text
- It is unclear whether Mr. Washington has adequately, and separately alleged trial counsel was ineffective for not raising a 2nd Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1). Even if he had, such a claim would be unsuccessful. A § 2255 movant claiming ineffective assistance bears the burden of showing (1) that counsel's performance fell below objective standards for reasonably effective representation and (2) that this deficiency prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688–94 (1984); Resnick v. United States, 7 F.4th 611, 619 (7th Cir. 2021). Bruen was decided after Mr. Washington pled guilty (albeit just a few days after). Generally, defense attorneys are 'not obliged to anticipate changes in the law' unless an argument 'is sufficiently foreshadowed in existing case law.' Bridges v. United States, 991 F.3d 793, 804 (7th Cir. 2021).
- For the reasons explained in this Order, Calvin Washington is not entitled to relief on his § 2255 motion. His motion for relief pursuant to § 2255 is DENIED and this action is dismissed with prejudice. Judgment consistent with this Order shall now issue and the Clerk shall docket a copy of this Order in No. 1:20-cr-00236-SEB-TAB-1. The motion to vacate, Crim. Dkt. 79, shall also be terminated in the underlying criminal action.
- The Court concludes that even if Mr. Washington could show 'cause' for not timely raising a constitutional challenge to § 922(g)(1), he could not show any resulting 'prejudice,' nor could he show that he is 'actually innocent.' This Court – the undersigned specifically – recently undertook a thorough historical analysis of whether § 922(g)(1) is facially unconstitutional post-Bruen. See United States v. Reed, No. 1:24-CR-00055-SEB-MJD, 2025 WL 3173913 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 13, 2025). The Court does not find it necessary to repeat the entirety of its analysis here. It suffices to say that after conducting that analysis, this Court concluded 'that § 922(g)(1) is facially constitutional because 'the Second Amendment permits the disarmament of individuals who pose a credible threat to the physical safety of others.'