Bernda Moyo (Suing as Administrator of the estate of the late Job Moyo) v United Quaries Limited (HP 1917 of 2019) [2020] ZMHC 252 (25 August 2020)

ZambiaLII

Automated Summary

Key Facts

The case involves Brenda Moyo, as administrator of the estate of Job Moyo who died on 26 July 2011 from injuries sustained at United Quaries Limited's crusher. The Plaintiff filed an action on 29 November 2019, over eight years later, alleging negligence and breach of statutory duty. The Defendant argued the claim was statute-barred under Section 3(a) of the Law Reforms (Limitation of Actions) Act (Cap 72) requiring claims for personal injury to be filed within three years. The Plaintiff countered by citing Section 26 of the Limitation Act 1939, claiming the limitation period was tolled due to the Defendant's alleged fraud or concealment. The Court ruled the action statute-barred as the Plaintiff did not specifically plead fraud or mistake in their pleadings, and the three-year limitation period had expired.

Issues

  • The court addressed whether the Plaintiff's action for damages arising from personal injuries (death of Job Moyo in 2011) was statute-barred under Section 3(a) of the Law Reforms (Limitation of Actions) Act Chapter 72 of Zambia, which prescribes a three-year limitation period for such claims. The action was filed in 2019, over eight years after the incident, leading the court to determine it was time-barred.
  • The court considered if the Plaintiff's delay in filing was justified by the Defendant's alleged failure to pay the estate and promises to settle. It ruled that negotiations for out-of-court settlements (ex curia) do not suspend the limitation period, citing Halsbury's Laws, and found the delay prejudicial to the Plaintiff.
  • The Plaintiff argued that the limitation period should be extended under Section 26 of the Limitation Act 1939, which applies when an action is based on fraud or concealment. The court found no specific pleading of fraud in the Statement of Claim, rejecting this argument and holding that the Plaintiff failed to meet the pleading requirements under Order 18 of the Rules of the Supreme Court.

Holdings

  • Leave to appeal was granted to the Plaintiff.
  • The court held that the Plaintiff's action was statute-barred under Section 3(a) of Chapter 72 of the Laws of Zambia (Limitation of Actions Act), as it was not filed within three years of the incident causing personal injury. The court found no valid pleading of fraud or mistake by the Plaintiff to invoke Section 26 of the Limitation Act 1939, and thus determined the action was improperly before the court due to exceeding the prescribed time limit. The application by the Defendant was granted with costs.

Remedies

  • Defendant's application to dismiss the action as statute barred is granted, with costs to be taxed in default of agreement.
  • Leave to appeal is granted to the plaintiff, allowing them to pursue further legal recourse.

Legal Principles

  • The court applied Section 3(a) of Chapter 72, which limits personal injury claims to three years from the event. The action was filed eight years after the incident, rendering it statute-barred.
  • The court held that the plaintiff must plead fraud or mistake in their pleadings under Order 18 of the RSC for the limitation period to be extended. The plaintiff's failure to specifically plead these issues invalidated their reliance on Section 26 of the Limitation Act 1939.

Precedent Name

  • Hakainde Hichilema and Geoffrey Bwalya Mwamba v. Edgar Chagwa Lungu and Others
  • Indo Zambia Bank v. Christine Banda

Cited Statute

  • Law Reforms (Limitation of Actions) Act
  • Limitation Act 1939

Judge Name

G. Milimo - Salasini

Passage Text

  • I concur with the submission by Counsel for the Defendant that... the Plaintiff has neither pleaded fraud nor mistake.
  • negotiations for ex curia settlements do not stop time from running... I find it difficult... to exercise my discretion in favour of the Plaintiff given the inordinate delay.
  • I therefore find as a matter of fact and indeed of law that the Plaintiff's action... became statute barred. Consequently, this Honourable Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the Plaintiff's action.