State Of Washington V Darius T Hammond

Key Facts

Issues

• Hammond argues the trial court abused its discretion by admitting DNA test results that were disclosed to him only two days after trial began. The court considers whether the State acted with due diligence under CrR 4.7 and whether the defendant's right to fair trial was violated by the late disclosure.
• Hammond contends the trial court violated double jeopardy protections when it vacated his second degree murder counts without specifying they were dismissed with prejudice. The court analyzes whether the separate order vacating lesser included offenses constituted an express ruling that kept convictions 'alive' for possible reinstatement.
• Hammond contends there is insufficient evidence to support his convictions for first degree murder with domestic violence designation and first degree unlawful possession of a firearm. The court reviews whether circumstantial evidence including surveillance footage, text messages, and physical evidence was sufficient for a rational fact finder to find all elements proven beyond reasonable doubt.
• Hammond argues that the trial court violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial when it granted two continuances in his first degree murder case. The court examines whether the delays crossed the threshold from ordinary to presumptively prejudicial delay under the Barker balancing test, considering the length of delay, reasons for delay, defendant's assertion of rights, and prejudice to the defendant.
• Hammond argues there is insufficient evidence that his relationship with the victim constituted a dating relationship required for domestic violence designation under Washington law. The court examines testimony about their romantic relationship, text messages using intimate language, and whether the relationship met the statutory definition of intimate partner.

Holdings

• The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the DNA evidence provided after trial started, as Hammond failed to show the State did not act with due diligence in turning it over.
• Evidence is sufficient to support first degree murder conviction based on circumstantial evidence including video footage, text messages with threats, and consciousness of guilt shown by hiding the duffel bag.
• The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the December 2023 continuance requested by defense counsel, as the reasons expressed were within legitimate bases under CrR 3.3 and case law for continuance over defendant's objection.
• Sufficient evidence supports the domestic violence designation for Hammond's murder conviction based on Della Williams' testimony that Hammond and Jadell were boyfriend and girlfriend, and text messages using terms of endearment.
• The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the State's motion for the second continuance in February 2024, as the State provided detailed reasoning including outstanding discovery needs and crime lab delays for DNA and ballistics testing.
• Evidence is sufficient to support first degree unlawful possession of a firearm conviction based on circumstantial evidence that leads to reasonable inference that Hammond killed Jadell with a gun, combined with autopsy confirmation of gunshot wound.
• Hammond's constitutional right to a speedy trial claim fails because he failed to show the threshold Barker factor that the length of delay crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from presumptively prejudicial delay.
• The trial court did not violate double jeopardy or the Supreme Court's holding in Turner when it vacated Hammond's lesser convictions for second degree murder without specifying with or without prejudice.

Remedies

Legal Principles

• Sufficiency of evidence claims are reviewed de novo, viewing evidence in light most favorable to the State. A rational finder of fact must be able to find all elements of charged crime proven beyond reasonable doubt. Direct and circumstantial evidence are equally reliable, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the State.
• The court applies the Barker v. Wingo balancing test for constitutional speedy trial claims, weighing four nonexclusive factors: (1) length of delay, (2) reason for delay, (3) defendant's assertion of right, and (4) level of prejudice. The length of delay serves as a threshold inquiry to determine whether delay crossed from ordinary to presumptively prejudicial before analyzing remaining factors.
• Washington's time-for-trial rule (CrR 3.3) requires detained defendants to be brought to trial within 60 days of arraignment. Continuances may be granted when required in the administration of justice and defendant will not be prejudiced, extending the deadline to 30 days after the new trial date. Objections to defense counsel's continuance motions are generally waived.
• Double jeopardy protections prevent multiple punishments for the same offense. When a defendant is convicted of greater and lesser included offenses, the trial court should enter judgment and sentence on the greater charge only, without reference to lesser offenses. Vacated lesser convictions are not 'valid' until reinstatement if the greater conviction is overturned on appeal. Courts should not conditionally vacate lesser convictions implying they remain valid.

Precedent Name

• State v. Scherf
• State v. Jussila
• State v. Turner
• State v. Saunders
• State v. Woods
• State v. Ollivier
• State v. Denton
• State v. Young

Cited Statute

• Evidence Rule 403
• Evidence Rule 901
• Revised Code of Washington 7.105.010
• Revised Code of Washington 9A.32.030
• Revised Code of Washington 10.99.020
• Revised Code of Washington 9A.32.020
• Criminal Rule 4.7
• Revised Code of Washington 2.06.040
• U.S. Constitution, Amendment VI
• Criminal Rule 3.3
• Washington Constitution Article I Section 22
• Revised Code of Washington 9.41.040

Judge Name

• Justice MAXA, who concurred with the opinion
• Justice PRICE, who authored the opinion
• Associate Chief Justice VELJAC, who concurred with the opinion

Passage Text

• Because Hammond has failed to meet his burden under CrR 4.7 and because he offers no alternative basis for the trial court to have erred, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the DNA evidence.
• We hold that Hammond has failed to show the threshold Barker factor—that the length of the delay 'crossed the threshold' dividing ordinary from presumptively prejudicial delay. Thus, Hammond's constitutional right to a speedy trial claim fails.
• All of the facts that were presented at trial together with all reasonable inferences construed in favor of the State are sufficient to support the trial court's finding of murder in the first degree. Hammond's argument that there was insufficient evidence for this crime fails.