Abby Windows Llc V Labor Industry Review Commission

Key Facts

Issues

• The court needed to determine whether Tarpey's sales, which included both physical products and incidental installation services, still qualified as sales of 'consumer products' under the statute. The question arose because Tarpey's work involved installing windows, doors, and other home improvement materials rather than merely selling standalone products, raising the issue of whether such installation services fundamentally changed the nature of the transaction from selling consumer products to selling services.
• The central legal question is whether Daniel Tarpey's work as a sales and design consultant for Abby Windows falls within the 'direct seller' exclusion from employment under WIS. STAT. § 108.02(15)(k)16. This hinges on whether Tarpey sold 'consumer products' as defined in the statute, given that he sold home improvement products including windows, doors, roofs, gutters, and siding, and performed incidental installation services as part of his sales.

Holdings

Remedies

Legal Principles

• Wisconsin's unemployment compensation law embodies a strong public policy in favor of compensating the unemployed, and WIS. STAT. ch. 108 is liberally construed to effect unemployment compensation coverage. However, exceptions to eligibility must be narrowly construed. The court determines that 'consumer products' refers to physical or tangible items purchased for personal use, and incidental installation services do not transform the nature of the item into something that is not a consumer product.
• The court applies the well-known statutory interpretation framework, beginning with the statutory text and ascertaining the plain meaning of the statute as adopted by the legislature. When statutory language is unambiguous, there is no need to consult extrinsic sources of interpretation such as legislative history or federal law. The court consults dictionaries to determine common and approved usage, and legal dictionaries for terms of art. Only when the plain meaning analysis reveals ambiguity may the court liberally or strictly construe the language.
• The court reviews LIRC's conclusions of law de novo, without deference to the administrative agency's legal conclusions or statutory interpretations. The court may set aside LIRC's order only upon specified grounds, including a determination that LIRC acted without or in excess of its powers by basing an order on an incorrect interpretation of a statute.

Precedent Name

• Anderson v. LIRC, 2021 WI App 44, ¶11 n.5, 398 Wis. 2d 668, 963 N.W.2d 89
• Mueller v. LIRC, 2019 WI App 50, ¶17, 388 Wis. 2d 602, 933 N.W.2d 645
• State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110
• National Safety Associates, Inc. v. LIRC, 199 Wis. 2d 106, 543 N.W.2d 584 (Ct. App. 1995)
• Amazon Logistics, Inc. v. LIRC, 2023 WI App 26, ¶¶23-24, 407 Wis. 2d 807, 992 N.W.2d 168
• Cleveland Institute of Electronics, Inc. v. United States, 787 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ohio 1992)

Cited Statute

• Wisconsin Unemployment Compensation Act
• Consumer Product Warranties Act

Judge Name

• Gundrum, P.J.
• Lazar, J.
• Grogan, J.

Passage Text

• When we consider these definitions of 'consumer' and 'product' together, we can readily discern that 'consumer products' as used in the statute unambiguously refers to physical or tangible items or objects an individual purchases for that individual's personal use in some manner. It is also apparent based on the definitions set forth above that 'consumer products' is broad enough to encompass those physical or tangible items or objects tied to (or that require) an incidental service such as installation or application of the product purchased. In other words, the mere fact that a physical or tangible product requires some type of incidental installation, application, or related service does not automatically transform the fundamental nature of the item into something that is not a 'consumer product.' Based on these definitions, the doors, windows, siding, and roofing Tarpey sold—which included incidental installation of those products—fall within the meaning of 'consumer products' as set forth in WIS. STAT. § 108.02(15)(k)16.
• WISCONSIN STAT. ch. 108 does not define 'consumer products' (nor does it define 'consumer' or 'products' individually), making it necessary to consult a dictionary to aid in our determination of what constitutes a 'consumer product' within Wisconsin's unemployment compensation law. 'Consumer' is reasonably and easily understood to mean someone who purchases something for that individual's personal use. 'Product' likewise has a similar meaning across these three dictionaries: '[S]omething produced: especially: commodity' or '[S]omething (such as a service) that is marketed or sold as a commodity.' Based on these definitions, a 'product' is generally, but not always, some type of physical item.
• For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude that LIRC failed to follow the well-known framework for statutory interpretation when it determined that 'consumer products' must be defined as 'products [that] are packaged and distributed for use, as delivered, by the purchaser' and that Tarpey did not sell 'consumer products' within the statutory meaning. Consequently, LIRC's interpretation and application of the plain-language meaning of 'consumer products' as used in WIS. STAT. § 108.02(15)(k)16 was 'without or in excess of its powers.' We reverse LIRC's decision and affirm the circuit court's order.