Automated Summary
Key Facts
The case involves an appeal by the Registered Trustees of the Evangelical Lutheran Church Tanzania Northwestern Diocese against the decision of the District Land and Housing Tribunal dated 14/01/2015. The appeal was filed on 23/04/2015, 100 days after the ruling. The Respondent Anas Swaibu raised a preliminary objection (P.O.) that the appeal was filed out of time under the Law of Limitation Act Cap 89 RE 2002, which prescribes 45 days for appeals without express time limits. The Appellant argued for a 90-day period based on case law and claimed the 45-day rule does not apply automatically without court leave. The court ruled that the appeal was filed out of time, sustaining the P.O. and dismissing the appeal with costs.
Issues
The primary issue was whether the appeal was filed within the time limit under the Law of Limitation Act. The Appellant claimed the 90-day period in Part I(1) of the schedule applied, citing the need to obtain certified copies of the ruling before the appeal period began. The Respondent argued the 45-day period in Part II(2) applied, as the appeal was filed 100 days after the ruling was delivered. The court concluded that the 45-day rule applied, dismissing the appeal for being filed out of time without seeking court leave. This interpretation aligned with the 2016 amendment to section 41 of Cap 216, which codified the 45-day limit, and the court rejected the Appellant's reliance on section 19(2) of Cap 89 to exclude the time taken to obtain documents.
Holdings
- The court held that the time for filing an appeal commences from the date the judgment or ruling is delivered, not when the appellant receives the certified copies. This determination was based on the principle that the case of Mary Kimaro vrs Khalfan Mohamed (1995) TLR 202, which addressed applications for extensions, is distinguishable from the current appeal filed without court leave. The ruling emphasized that the time limit is calculated from the delivery of the decision by the District Land and Housing Tribunal on 14/1/2015.
- The court concluded that Part II (2) of the schedule to section 3 of the Law of Limitation Act Cap 89 (45-day period) applies to appeals from the District Land and Housing Tribunal, rather than Part I (1) of the same schedule (90-day period under the Civil Procedure Code). This interpretation was supported by the 2016 amendment to section 41 of Cap 216, which explicitly set a 45-day limitation, and the court rejected the Appellant's reliance on the unreported case of Hosea William (2011) for a 90-day period, noting it was not binding.
Remedies
The appeal was dismissed with costs under section 3 (1) of the Law of Limitation Act Cap 89 RE 2002, having been found to have been filed out of time without court leave. The preliminary objection (P.O.) raised by the Respondent was sustained.
Legal Principles
- The court emphasized the principle of judicial independence in departing from prior decisions when necessary, citing the Kiganga case to avoid conflicting rulings and ensure consistency in legal interpretation.
- The court applied the 45-day limitation period for appeals under Part II(2) of the schedule to the Law of Limitation Act (Cap 89) where no specific period is prescribed by statute. It held that the time for filing an appeal begins to run from the date the judgment or ruling is delivered, not when the appellant receives the documents.
Precedent Name
- Praxeda Jambo vrs Edward Jambo
- Mary Kimaro vrs Khalfan Mohamed
- Hosea William and Edward Mushenga and Another
- Ponsian Baitataffe vrs Khalid S. Hussein and 3 Others
- Stephen Mapunda vrs Shirika la Usafiri Dar es salaam and Another
- Automobile Stores Ltd vrs L.K. Msoga
Cited Statute
- Land Disputes Courts Act, Cap 216 RE 2002
- Law of Limitation Act, Cap 89 RE 2002
Judge Name
Justice Kairo
Passage Text
- The Appellant has sought to invoke section 19 (2) of Cap 89 (supra) to verify that the appeal is within time as the days to follow up for the ruling was to be excluded. However having found that the appeal was to be filed 45 days, the said section is irrelevant and cannot rescue the situation.
- In my understanding, time starts to run from the date when the judgment or ruling was pronounced for the purpose of limitation. Various cases are in support of this stance [Refer the case of Automobile Stores (supra) which held "Therefore, the time for filing an appeal should be measured from the date the Judgment was pronounced".
- I thus agree that this appeal was filed out of time and no leave of the court was sought to have it filed out of time.