Derrick Wayne Chavers Aka Derrick Chavers V State Of Mississippi

Key Facts

Issues

• Chavers argued that the circuit court erred by giving Jury Instruction S-6, a voluntary intoxication instruction, claiming intoxication was not an element of the charged offenses and the instruction was misleading. The court analyzed whether voluntary intoxication is a defense to culpable-negligence manslaughter and aggravated assault, noting these are general-intent crimes. The court held that the instruction correctly stated the law and, when read as a whole with other instructions, fairly announced the applicable rules without creating reversible error.
• During jury deliberations, the jury was accidentally given the wrong written instructions—those marked 'refused' or 'withdrawn' instead of the correct instructions. The court immediately substituted the correct instructions, and jurors confirmed their verdict was not based on the incorrect set. The court distinguished this from Reynolds v. Allied Emergency Services, where the mistake was not corrected. Chavers waived the issue by failing to move for a mistrial and the court found no likelihood of prejudice since the error was promptly corrected during deliberations.
• Chavers argued the evidence was insufficient to support convictions for culpable-negligence manslaughter (killing of Wesley Smith and Levi Lewis) and aggravated assault (serious bodily injury to Cody Smith). The court reviewed evidence showing Chavers drove a UTV at high speed in the dark toward a residence where he knew a large group was gathered. Witnesses testified about conflicting testimony regarding intoxication and speed. The court found sufficient evidence for a rational juror to find Chavers acted with negligence tantamount to wanton disregard for human safety, and that this culpable negligence caused the deaths and serious injury.

Holdings

• The appellant is not entitled to a new trial because the jury mistake with refused or withdrawn instructions was corrected during deliberations, and the jurors confirmed their verdict was not based on the incorrect instructions. The mistake was promptly corrected while the jury was deliberating.
• The evidence was sufficient to sustain the appellant's convictions for manslaughter and aggravated assault. Rational jurors could find the State proved each element of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, as Chavers drove a UTV at high speed toward a residence where he knew a large group of people were gathered.
• The trial court did not abuse its discretion by giving the State's proposed voluntary intoxication jury instruction, as voluntary intoxication is not a defense to culpable-negligence manslaughter or aggravated assault since they are general-intent crimes. The instructions as a whole fairly announced the applicable law.
• The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, finding no reversible error on appeal. The appellant's convictions for two counts of manslaughter and one count of aggravated assault were upheld.

Remedies

Legal Principles

• When reviewing a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence de novo, the court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and decides whether rational jurors could have found the State proved each element of the crime. The court is not required to decide whether it thinks the State proved the elements, but rather whether a reasonable juror could rationally say the State did. Conviction must be affirmed if there is sufficient evidence for a rational juror to find the State proved all elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
• The jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant caused serious bodily injury to the victim purposely, knowingly, or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life for aggravated assault. For culpable-negligence manslaughter, the defendant must have acted with negligence of a degree so gross as to be tantamount to a wanton disregard or utter indifference to the safety of human life.
• When prejudicial error occurs during trial, the defendant must ask the trial court for a mistrial immediately rather than waiting for a favorable verdict and then seeking reversal on appeal. Failure to move for mistrial waives the issue. The court also presumes jurors follow the instructions provided after any correction of instructions during deliberations.
• Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to culpable-negligence manslaughter or aggravated assault since they are both general-intent crimes. The court held that if a defendant, when sober, is capable of distinguishing between right and wrong, and voluntarily deprives himself of that ability by becoming intoxicated and commits an offense while intoxicated, he is criminally responsible. Culpable negligence requires recklessness or willful disregard of an unreasonable risk, and aggravated assault requires recklessness under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.

Precedent Name

• Johnson v. State
• Kirk v. State
• Mills v. State
• Newell v. State
• Neal v. State
• Taconi v. State
• Blackwell v. State
• O'Kelly v. State
• Poole v. State
• Reynolds v. Allied Emergency Services PC
• Shumpert v. State

Cited Statute

Judge Name

• McCarty, J.
• Westbrooks, J.
• Wilson, P.J.

Passage Text

• ¶1. Derrick Chavers drove a utility task vehicle (UTV) into a group of people who were leaving a party, killing two individuals and injuring a third. Following a jury trial, Chavers was convicted of two counts of manslaughter and one count of aggravated assault. On appeal, Chavers argues that the trial court erred by giving a voluntary intoxication jury instruction, that he was entitled to a new trial after the jury was mistakenly given written jury instructions that had been 'refused' or 'withdrawn,' and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. We find no reversible error and affirm.
• ¶31. Unlike Reynolds, the record does not establish a 'likelihood' that Chavers was prejudiced by the trial court's initial mistake, which the court promptly corrected while the jury was in deliberation and waiting for the judge to respond to their note. The incorrect instructions were retrieved, and the jury was given the correct instructions and instructed to continue deliberating. 'This Court presumes that jurors follow the instructions of the court. To presume otherwise would be to render the jury system inoperable.' Neal v. State, 15 So. 3d 388, 402 (¶30) (Miss. 2009) (ellipsis and quotation marks omitted) (quoting Moore v. State, 787 So. 2d 1282, 1291 (¶30) (Miss. 2001)). While it was certainly error for the court to give the jurors the wrong set of jury instructions, the mistake was corrected during deliberations, and we presume that the jurors deliberated and returned their verdict in accordance with the correct set of jury instructions provided to them. Accordingly, Chavers is not entitled to a new trial.
• ¶35. Evidence shows that Chavers was driving the UTV at a high rate of speed in the dark toward a residence where he knew a large group of people were gathered at a party. On appeal, Chavers argues that '[n]o one was in the street' when he drove away from the party and that he had 'no reason... to expect or know people would be on the road when [he] returned' about eight minutes later. However, various witnesses testified that 50 to 100 guests or more were at the party, that guests were socializing outside the house, including in the front yard, and that cars were parked all along both sides of the road. The video played for the jury at trial likewise shows cars parked along the road. Under these circumstances, it was easily foreseeable that guests might be in the road returning to their cars at any given time. There was also conflicting testimony about whether and how much Chavers had to drink before the wreck, and the evidence permits a reasonable inference that Chavers allowed his own son to take responsibility for the wreck so that Chavers could avoid submitting to a blood-alcohol test. Ultimately, there was sufficient evidence for a rational juror to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Chavers acted and drove with 'negligence of a degree so gross as to be tantamount to a wanton disregard, or utter indifference to, the safety of human life,' O'Kelly, 267 So. 3d at 291 (¶31)—with a 'reckless[] or . . . willful disregard [of] an unreasonable risk.' Shumpert, 935 So. 2d at 967 (¶14). In addition, a rational juror could find that Chavers's culpable negligence caused the death of Wesley Smith and Levi Lewis. Viewing such evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational jury could find Chavers guilty of culpable-negligence manslaughter beyond a reasonable doubt.