State Of Louisiana V Demetric Cornell Savoy

Court Listener

Automated Summary

Key Facts

Defendant Demetric Cornell Savoy was convicted of second degree murder and unauthorized entry for the killing of Heather Mouton on May 24, 2018, in Crowley, Louisiana. The victim received two gunshot wounds to her head from a .22 caliber weapon. Her eleven-year-old daughter Haleigh Patton testified she saw Savoy enter her room shortly before the shooting, describing him as wearing a white shirt and dark jeans. Surveillance footage captured a matching individual entering and fleeing the residence within minutes. Savoy was apprehended approximately one hour after the murder at his residence, though he had changed his clothing. The appellate court reviewed four grounds for appeal including insufficient evidence, manslaughter reduction, admissibility of protective order statements, and surveillance video admissibility before affirming the conviction.

Issues

  • The court analyzed the admissibility of Ms. Mouton's statements made in her applications for protective orders. The Defendant contended these statements were testimonial hearsay that should be excluded under Crawford v. Washington. The court applied the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception under La.Code Evid. art. 804(B)(7), which allows admission of statements when the party engaged in wrongdoing intended to procure the declarant's unavailability as a witness. Citing State v. Moran and Giles v. California, the court found Defendant's threats to kill Ms. Mouton if she reported him established the requisite intent. The court held the statements were admissible under the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception.
  • The court addressed the Defendant's challenge to the admission of surveillance video obtained from the victim's neighbor, Ms. Isalee Malbrough. The Defendant filed a Motion to Quash, arguing police failed to preserve video beyond a five-minute time frame and the video showed multiple suspects at the residence. The court analyzed authentication requirements under La.Code Evid. art. 901(A) and State v. Rice. The court found sufficient testimony from Officer Osborne and Ms. Malbrough who viewed the footage on the night of the murder. The court held the evidence was sufficient to prove the video was what the State purported it to be, and any chain of custody defects went to weight rather than admissibility.
  • The court addressed whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support Defendant's conviction for second degree murder of Heather Mouton. The Defendant challenged the credibility of the victim's daughter, Haleigh Patton, who testified she saw Defendant in the house immediately before Ms. Mouton was shot twice in the head. The court analyzed the evidence under the Jackson standard of review, noting the case was based primarily on circumstantial evidence. The court found the State's evidence sufficient because Ms. Patton's testimony definitively placed Defendant inside the residence at the time of the murder, and there was no evidence he remained in the home when Mrs. Montgomery returned. The court concluded a rational trier of fact could have found the State excluded every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.
  • The court examined whether the Defendant should be convicted of the lesser included offense of manslaughter rather than second degree murder. The Defendant argued the volatile relationship between the parties and Ms. Mouton's alleged new relationships constituted provocation sufficient for manslaughter. The court reviewed La.R.S. 14:31(A)(1), which defines manslaughter as a homicide committed in sudden passion or heat of blood caused by provocation. The court found no evidence that Defendant killed Ms. Mouton in sudden passion or heat of blood, particularly given their previous argument occurred two weeks before the murder. The Defendant failed to prove the existence of any mitigating factors required for a manslaughter conviction.

Holdings

The court affirmed the defendant's conviction and sentence for second degree murder and unauthorized entry into an inhabited dwelling. The court rejected the defendant's four assignments of error: (1) insufficient evidence to convict of second degree murder, as the victim's daughter's testimony definitively placed the defendant in the house at the time of death and the evidence excluded reasonable hypotheses of innocence; (2) no manslaughter due to lack of sudden passion or heat of blood mitigating factors; (3) protective order statements were admissible under the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception; (4) surveillance video evidence was properly authenticated and admissible.

Remedies

Defendant's conviction and sentence for second degree murder and unauthorized entry into an inhabited dwelling were affirmed on appeal by the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit.

Legal Principles

  • The forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the general prohibition against hearsay is set forth in La.Code Evid. art. 804(B)(7). A statement offered against a party that has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness. The court held that Defendant's threat to kill Ms. Mouton if she reported him to police, followed by her death after she reported him, established the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception.
  • When the issue of sufficiency of evidence is raised on appeal, the critical inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond reasonable doubt. The role of the fact finder is to weigh the respective credibility of the witnesses, and the appellate court should not second guess the credibility determinations of the triers of fact beyond the sufficiency evaluations under the Jackson standard of review.
  • In order for the court to affirm a conviction, the record must reflect that the state has satisfied its burden of proving the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In the instant case, the State's evidence was sufficient to support the Defendant's conviction despite being based almost entirely on circumstantial evidence.

Precedent Name

  • Jackson v. Virginia
  • State v. Major
  • State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King
  • State v. Rice
  • State v. Moran
  • Giles v. California

Cited Statute

  • Louisiana Revised Statutes Article 31
  • Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 804(B)(7)
  • Louisiana Revised Statutes Article 15:438
  • Louisiana Revised Statutes Article 30.1

Judge Name

  • Van H. Kyzar
  • D. Kent Savoie
  • Ledricka J. Thierry

Passage Text

  • when the conviction is based on circumstantial evidence, La. R.S. 15:438 sets forth the rule that 'assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove, in order to convict, [the circumstantial evidence] must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.' However, La. R.S. 15:438 does not establish a stricter standard of review than the more general rational juror's reasonable doubt formula; rather it serves as a helpful evidentiary guide for jurors when evaluating circumstantial evidence.
  • When the issue of sufficiency of evidence is raised on appeal, the critical inquiry of the reviewing court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 890, 100 S.Ct. 195, 62 L.Ed.2d 126 (1979)
  • Following Moran, we find the statements made by Ms. Mouton in her applications for protective orders were admissible under the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the hearsay rule. Like Moran, Defendant threatened to kill Ms. Mouton if she reported him to police; like Moran, the victim was killed shortly after Defendant learned she had reported him to police.