Automated Summary
Key Facts
This case addresses whether an arbitrator's multiple appointments in related arbitrations without disclosure created an appearance of bias. Halliburton challenged the appointment of Mr. Rokison as chairman in its arbitration against Chubb, arguing he accepted appointments in two other Deepwater Horizon-related arbitrations (references 2 and 3) without informing Halliburton. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that while there was a legal duty to disclose such appointments, the fair-minded and informed observer would not conclude there was a real possibility of bias given the limited overlap and Mr. Rokison's explanations.
Issues
- The first issue concerns the circumstances in which an arbitrator may accept appointments in multiple references concerning the same or overlapping subject matter with only one common party without thereby giving rise to an appearance of bias. This includes evaluating whether such appointments, in the context of Bermuda Form arbitrations, could reasonably lead to justifiable doubts about the arbitrator's impartiality, particularly considering the custom and practice in the relevant field of arbitration.
- The second issue addresses the legal obligation of disclosure for arbitrators involved in multiple references with overlapping subject matter and a single common party. The court must determine if the arbitrator is under a duty to disclose such appointments to the non-common party, considering the statutory requirements under the Arbitration Act 1996 and the balance between the duty of impartiality and the duty of confidentiality in arbitration.
Holdings
- The appeal was dismissed because the fair-minded and informed observer would not conclude there was a real possibility of bias at the time of the hearing, considering the arbitrator's explanation, the limited overlap between cases, and the absence of bad faith.
- The Supreme Court held that an arbitrator in Bermuda Form arbitrations has a legal duty to disclose multiple appointments involving overlapping subject matter with only one common party, absent an agreement to the contrary. The failure to disclose such appointments may give rise to justifiable doubts about impartiality, but the court found no real possibility of bias at the time of the hearing due to the arbitrator's genuine oversight and the limited overlap between cases.
- The Court of Appeal's formulation of the duty of disclosure was upheld as correct under English law, requiring arbitrators to disclose matters that might reasonably cause doubts about impartiality. This duty is objective and distinct from arbitral institution rules that focus on party perceptions.
Remedies
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the lower courts' decisions that there was no real possibility of bias in the arbitrator's conduct.
Legal Principles
The case establishes that arbitrators must act impartially and disclose circumstances that might give rise to justifiable doubts about their impartiality. The principle of 'natural justice' is central, requiring that justice be seen to be done. The fair-minded and informed observer test is applied to determine whether there is a real possibility of bias, with a focus on the arbitrator's statutory obligations under the 1996 Arbitration Act.
Precedent Name
- Locabail (UK) Ltd v Bayfield Properties Ltd
- In re S (A Child)
- Tito v Waddell
- Emmott v Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd
- Almazeedi v Penner
- PAO Tatneft v Ukraine
- Stubbs v The Queen
- Dring v Cape Intermediate Holdings Ltd
- Khuja v Times Newspapers Ltd
- Davidson v Scottish Ministers (No 2)
- The Eastern Saga
- Helow v Secretary of State for the Home Department
Cited Statute
Arbitration Act 1996
Judge Name
- Lord Hodge
- Lady Black
- Lady Arden
- Lord Reed
- Lord Lloyd-Jones
Passage Text
- The appeal therefore fails.
- The court must look at all the circumstances as they appear from the material before it, not just at the facts known to the objectors or available to the hypothetical observer at the time of the decision.
- The fair-minded and informed observer would not regard [Mr Rokison] as unable to act impartially in the reference between [Halliburton] and [Chubb] merely by virtue of the fact that he might be an arbitrator in other references arising out the incident, and might hear different evidence or argument advanced in another such reference.