Automated Summary
Key Facts
The Claimants (Kevin Cooper, Stephen Powell, and Jennifer Powell) claimed rights to light appurtenant to their flats over the Defendant's (Ludgate House Limited) development site, alleging that the construction of Arbor infringed those rights. They sought mandatory injunctive relief to cut back Arbor, alternatively damages in lieu. Judgment was handed down on 8 July 2025 with the Claimants found in their favor but refused injunctive relief on discretionary grounds. Damages were awarded at £350,000 for Mr Cooper and £500,000 for Mr and Mrs Powell, later adjusted to £397,484.64 and £567,835.21 respectively after interest agreement. The costs issue centered on whether the Claimants were the successful party and the impact of Part 36 offers made by the Defendant on 18 November 2024. The court determined the Claimants were successful parties but not wholly successful, as they failed to obtain injunctive relief and lost on the discretionary injunction issue, which was of particular importance to the Defendant given the potential cost of cutting back Arbor. Costs were awarded at 2/3 to Mr and Mrs Powell and 1/3 to Mr Cooper.
Issues
- Whether the Defendant's November 2024 settlement offers constituted valid Part 36 offers under CPR rule 36.5, particularly when they included terms for the release of property rights and future statutory compensation claims beyond the pleaded claim, and whether such offers properly stated that they relate to the whole of the claim.
- What order for costs should be made, considering the Claimants' mixed success on different aspects of the claim, the Defendant's success on the injunction issue, and the impact of the November 2024 Part 36 offers on the costs assessment for each Claimant.
- Determining which party is the successful party for CPR rule 44.2 purposes, considering the Claimants' mixed success on injunctive relief versus damages, and the impact of the November 2024 Part 36 offers on the costs assessment.
Holdings
- The court held that the November 2024 settlement offer to Mr Cooper was a valid Part 36 offer despite including terms about future section 204 claims and property rights. The Defendant could not establish that Mr Cooper failed to achieve a more advantageous outcome than the offer. Costs were split: Mr and Mrs Powell received two-thirds of their costs, while Mr Cooper received one-third of his costs due to his unreasonable counter-offer stance.
- The November 2024 offer to Mr Cooper was a valid Part 36 offer. Defendant did not prove Mr Cooper failed to obtain a more advantageous judgment. Costs: Powell two-thirds; Cooper one-third.
- The court determined that the November 2024 offer to Mr Cooper was a valid Part 36 offer, but the Defendant failed to prove that Mr Cooper failed to obtain a more advantageous judgment than the offer. For costs, Mr and Mrs Powell were awarded two-thirds of their costs, and Mr Cooper was awarded one-third of his costs. The court also held that the offer of settlement to Mr Cooper included terms relating to future section 204 claims and property rights, which did not invalidate the offer as a Part 36 offer.
Remedies
Damages in lieu of injunctive relief awarded on a negotiating damages basis - £350,000 for Mr Cooper and £500,000 for Mr and Mrs Powell. With interest, judgment entered for £397,484.64 for Mr Cooper and £567,835.21 for Mr and Mrs Powell. Injunctive relief was refused on a discretionary basis.
Monetary Damages
965319.85
Legal Principles
- The court examined whether the November 2024 offers were valid Part 36 offers under CPR 36.5, considering whether an offer can include terms beyond the pleaded claim (release of property rights, future section 204 claims) and whether it must 'relate to the whole of the claim.' The court concluded that an offer stating it relates to the whole claim is valid even if terms go beyond what was claimed, and the burden lies on the party relying on an unaccepted Part 36 offer to prove the judgment was more advantageous.
- The court applied CPR rule 44.2 to determine the successful party for costs, considering whether claimants won something of value they could not have won without fighting the action, and whether the defendant substantially denied what they sought. The court noted the general rule is only a starting point and can be modified under CPR 44.2(2)(b), (4), (5), including taking account of the significance of offers made. The court awarded two-thirds of costs to the Powells and one-third to Cooper, considering the Defendant's success on the important injunction issue and the impact of Part 36 offers.
- The court established that a Part 36 offer must state whether it relates to the whole, part, or issue of the claim, and the offer's terms don't need exact correlation with what is pleaded. The court also discussed the burden on the party relying on an unaccepted Part 36 offer to prove the judgment was more advantageous under rule 36.17, and that the court can disapply standard consequences if unusual terms make evaluation within 21 days unreasonable.
Precedent Name
- Kastor Navigation Co Ltd v AXA Global Risk (UK) Ltd
- Coldunell Ltd v Hotel Management International Ltd
- Roache v News Group Newspapers Ltd
- Hertel v Saunders
- Calonne Construction Ltd v Dawnus Southern Ltd
- Grant v FR Acquisitions Corporation (Europe) Ltd
Cited Statute
Housing and Planning Act 2016
Judge Name
Mr Justice Fancourt
Passage Text
- 13. In those circumstances, apart from the November 2024 offers, I conclude that the Claimants were the successful parties but that they were not wholly successful on their claims. The issue on which they lost was an issue of importance, and one of particular importance for the Defendant, given the potentially huge cost of having to cut back Arbor to reinstate sufficient of the obstructed light. This is therefore not a case where some issues have been incidentally lost along the road to judgment which do not impact the overall order for costs. This is a case where the obvious order is that the Claimants be awarded a proportion of their costs, taking into account the Defendant's success on an important issue, and where the costs were expended.
- 63. I therefore conclude that the November 2024 offer to Mr Cooper was a valid Part 36 offer, but, for the reasons that I have given, the Defendant has not proved that Mr Cooper has failed to achieve a more advantageous outcome by the terms of the judgment and so the consequences specified in rule 36.17(3) do not apply.
- 57. In my judgment, Mr Lees is correct. The requirement in rule 36.5(1)(d) that the offer state whether it relates to the whole of the claim, a part of the claim or an issue in it, means just that. It is a requirement for one of those descriptions to appear on the face of the offer, and for any part or issue to be identified. The reason is that the consequences that follow from a valid Part 36 offer, whether accepted or not accepted, depend on which of those offers it is: see [41] above. The offeree needs to know which it is.