Automated Summary
Key Facts
Rajolei Dejahl Pickens died from acute alcohol intoxication after being left on a patio bench at The Downtown Grill. The bar was operated by Jamie Bowman under a lease with landowner Robert J. Hewitt. Appellant Kimberly Pickens sued Hewitt for negligence and premises liability, arguing he had a duty to evict Bowman due to repeated alleged violations of lease terms regarding criminal activity. The trial court granted summary judgment for Hewitt, and the appellate court affirmed, holding that Hewitt retained no control over the premises and thus owed no duty to protect patrons from the bar's criminal acts.
Issues
- Whether Hewitt's contractual right to evict The Downtown Grill for criminal activity imposed a duty in tort on Hewitt to evict the tenant and protect third parties, and if so, whether this duty was breached.
- Whether the landowner, Robert J. Hewitt, owed a duty to the plaintiff under premises liability to protect Rajolei Pickens from the criminal acts of The Downtown Grill's employees, specifically the alleged overservice of alcohol leading to his death.
Holdings
- The court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Hewitt, finding that Hewitt owed no duty to Rajolei under a premises liability theory because he did not control the premises. The court emphasized that ownership alone does not equate to control, and the lease granted The Downtown Grill exclusive possession and control.
- The court concluded that Hewitt's contractual right to evict the tenant under the lease provision did not create a tort duty to third parties. Appellant's argument that the lease provision imposed a duty was rejected, as Texas law does not recognize contractual rights as imposing tort duties without direct control.
Remedies
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Robert J. Hewitt, concluding that no genuine issue of material fact existed and that Hewitt owed no duty to the plaintiff under premises liability or contractual theories.
Legal Principles
- The court addressed whether the plaintiff could assert a premises liability claim without being a third-party beneficiary of the lease. It concluded that privity of contract is not required for premises liability claims, but the plaintiff's claim failed because the landlord had no control over the premises, regardless of contractual rights.
- The court held that a landowner does not owe a duty of care to protect invitees from criminal acts of third parties unless the landowner maintains control over the premises. Ownership alone is not sufficient; control must be demonstrated. The lease provision granting the landlord the right to evict the tenant for criminal activity was found not to establish control, as the tenant retained exclusive possession and management.
Precedent Name
- Timberwalk Apartments, Partners, Inc. v. Cain
- S. Tex. Water Auth. v. Lomas
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- H.E.Y. Tr. v. Popcorn Express Co.
- Dickinson Arms-REO, L.P. v. Campbell
- Johnson Cnty. Sheriff's Posse, Inc. v. Endsley
- Levesque v. Wilkens
- Exxon Corp. v. Tidwell
- Diez v. Alaska Structures, Inc.
- De Leon v. Creely
- Lefmark Mgmt. Co. v. Old
- Abest Holdings, LLC v. Fort Worth Mar-G, Ltd.
- El Chico Corp. v. Poole
Cited Statute
Texas Alcohol Beverage Code
Judge Name
- Peña
- Ysmael D. Fonseca
- Cron
Passage Text
- As a general rule, a person has no legal duty to protect another from the criminal acts of a third person or control the conduct of another.
- Here, Hewitt signed a lease with The Downtown Grill granting the bar exclusive control over the premises. The record does not indicate Hewitt maintained any type of control over the property or preserved any ability to dictate to The Downtown Grill on how to run the premises.
- Having the power to evict alone does not create the possessory interest if Hewitt does not otherwise access any control over the premises. 'The reservation of a right to re-entry . . . does not amount to a retention of control.' Jensen v. Sw. Rodeo, L.P., 350 S.W.3d 755, 758 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.).