Automated Summary
Key Facts
Defendant William Felix Vail was indicted for the 1962 second degree murder of his wife Mary Horton Vail. The State filed a 404(B) Notice intending to introduce evidence of Sharon Hensley's 1973 disappearance and Annette Carver-Vail's 1984 disappearance. The trial court ruled the evidence was admissible under the doctrine of chances to rebut claims of accident. The Court of Appeal denied the writ, affirming the trial court's ruling that the State could introduce evidence of the disappearances to prove absence of mistake or accident.
Issues
- Whether the doctrine of chances properly applied in this case, where the State argued that multiple similar disappearances of women connected to the Defendant negated the possibility of accident or inadvertence regarding the death of his first wife in 1962.
- Whether the trial court properly admitted evidence of other wrongs or acts under Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 404(B) regarding the disappearances of Sharon Hensley in 1973 and Annette Carver-Vail in 1984, which the State sought to introduce to rebut the Defendant's claim that his first wife's death was accidental.
- Whether the probative value of evidence regarding the disappearances of two women outweighed its prejudicial effect under Article 403, and whether the trial court properly balanced these factors when ruling that the evidence was admissible at trial.
Holdings
The Court of Appeal denied the writ, finding no error in the trial court's March 19, 2014 ruling that permitted the State to introduce evidence of the disappearances of Annette Carver-Vail and Sharon Hensley at the murder trial of William Felix Vail. The court concluded that the trial court properly invoked the exception to admit similar offense evidence under Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 404(B) to negate self-defense and lack of intent claims, and determined that the probative value of the evidence outweighed any unfair prejudice.
Remedies
The appellate court denied the defendant's writ of appeal, affirming the trial court's March 19, 2014 ruling that allowed the State to introduce evidence of the disappearances of Annette Carver-Vail and Sharon Hensley at trial.
Legal Principles
- Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 404(B) governs admissibility of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Such evidence is not admissible to prove character but may be admissible for other purposes including proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident. Evidence of other acts may be admitted even if they occurred after the charged offense. The State must prove other crimes by clear and convincing evidence. Article 403 requires probative value to outweigh unfair prejudice.
- The State must prove other crimes, wrongs, or acts by clear and convincing evidence. The defendant contends that he will be unfairly prejudiced if required to prove the women were still alive. The court determined there is a real and genuine contested issue of intent at trial, which permits admission of other acts evidence to negate self-defense claims.
- The burden is on the State to prove by clear and convincing evidence that a defendant committed other crimes, wrongs, or acts. The defendant bears the burden to show that he was unfairly prejudiced by the admission of other crimes evidence. A trial court's ruling on admissibility will not be disturbed absent abuse of discretion.
- Louisiana Civil Code Article 30 provides that when a person has disappeared under circumstances such that death seems certain, death is considered established even though no body has been found. Article 54 establishes that a person absent for five years may be presumed and declared dead upon petition to the court. The court may presume the women were dead for purposes of determining admissibility without violating presumption of innocence.
Precedent Name
- People v. Mardlin, 487 Mich. 609, 790 N.W.2d 607 (2010)
- State v. Sutfield, 354 So.2d 1334 (La.1978)
- State v. Prieur, 277 So.2d 126 (La.1973)
- State v. Galliano, 02-2849 (La. 1/10/03), 839 So.2d 932
- State v. Monroe, 364 So.2d 570 (La.1978)
- Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180, 117 S.Ct. 644, 650, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997)
- State v. Davis, 12-512, p. 20 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/24/13), 115 So.3d 68, 80, writ denied, 13-1205 (La. 11/22/13), 126 So.3d 479
- State v. Dorsey, 34,977 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/26/01), 796 So.2d 135
- State v. Crawford, 95-1352, p. 19 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/3/96), 672 So.2d 197, 208-09, writ denied, 96-1126 (La. 10/4/96), 679 So.2d 1379
Cited Statute
- Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 404(B) - Other crimes, wrongs, or acts
- Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 403 - Probative value versus unfair prejudice
- Louisiana Civil Code Article 30 - Presumption of death after disappearance
- Louisiana Civil Code Article 54 - Five year presumption of death period
- Louisiana Revised Statutes Section 14:30.1
Judge Name
- Judge John D. Saunders
- Judge Billy Howard Ezell
- Judge Phyllis M. Keaty
Passage Text
- We find that the lack of direct evidence that Defendant disposed of Ms. Hensley and Ms. Carver-Vail does not preclude or weigh against admission. To the contrary, Defendant's apparent lack of direct culpability weighs in favor of admission because it minimizes impermissible negative inferences about his character. In this case, as noted above in Mardlin, 790 N.W. 2d at 619, 'the evidence does not create the traditional intermediate inference about character or criminal propensities associated with established, past criminal acts or convictions.' The burden is on the State to prove by clear and convincing evidence that there were other criminal acts performed by Defendant in this case that bear upon determination of the crime charged. While the evidence is prejudicial, this court concludes that there is little danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issue, or misleading of the jury.
- The analysis up to this point by the Court leads it to rule that these two instances of disappearance and likely deaths are admissible at the trial of Felix Vail for the murder of Mary Vail.
- The doctrine of chances—also known as the 'doctrine of objective improbability'—is a 'theory of logical relevance [that] does not depend on a character inference.' Under this theory, as the number of incidents of an out-of-the-ordinary event increases in relation to a particular defendant, the objective probability increases that the charged act and/or the prior occurrences were not the result of natural causes.