Jonathan Kerr V Stacey Wilson

Key Facts

Issues

• Whether the superior court erred by awarding attorney fees to Wilson without specifying a statutory basis for the fees and without making necessary factual findings to support the award
• Whether Kerr was properly found in contempt for failing to pay child support as detailed in the Tennessee divorce decree, and whether the superior court erred by entering the contempt order prior to domesticating the Tennessee divorce decree
• Whether the superior court erred in confirming the Tennessee divorce decree based on Kerr's failure to request a hearing pursuant to OCGA § 19-9-85(d), and whether the court properly afforded full faith and credit to the decree when the petition did not meet registration requirements under OCGA § 19-9-85(a)

Holdings

Remedies

• The Court vacates the superior court's award of $1,500 in attorney fees and court costs to Wilson. The order did not specify a statutory basis for the fee award, analyze the relative financial circumstances of the parties, or specify any conduct by Kerr on which the award might have been based. The case is remanded to the trial court so that the necessary findings may be made.
• The Court vacates the superior court's order confirming the Tennessee divorce decree in Case No. A20A2015 and remands the case for factual findings on the merits regarding whether the Tennessee divorce decree should be domesticated. In Case No. A20A1668, the Court vacates the award of attorney fees and remands the case with direction for the necessary findings to support the fee award.
• The Court affirms the superior court's finding that Kerr was in contempt for failing to pay child support as detailed in the Tennessee divorce decree. This finding is based on the requirement that child support orders from other states must be given full faith and credit, and none of the jurisdictional criteria were challenged by Kerr.

Legal Principles

• Under OCGA § 19-9-85(a), a litigant must file: (1) a letter requesting registration; (2) two copies including one certified copy of the determination sought to be registered, with a statement under penalty of perjury that the order has not been modified; and (3) the name and address of the person seeking registration and any parent awarded custody or visitation. The superior court erred by confirming registration when only one certified copy was filed instead of two copies, making it not a registered order under § 19-9-85(a). Because the order was not properly registered, the court should have treated the filing as a petition to domesticate rather than applying § 19-9-85(e) automatic confirmation.
• When there is no transcript of a hearing on appeal, the appellate court must presume that the evidence supports the trial court's findings. Under OCGA § 5-6-41(c), it is the appellant's duty to have the transcript prepared and included in the record. Because Kerr failed to attach the transcript of the hearing, the Court could not determine whether the issue was properly preserved, and the trial court's finding of contempt was therefore affirmed.
• Under 28 USC § 1738B(a)(1), full faith and credit must be given to child support orders of foreign states. A child support order is made 'consistently with this section' if made in a court with proper subject matter and personal jurisdiction, and if proper notice and opportunity to be heard are given to the parties. Georgia courts may enforce foreign child support orders without domestication, but may only modify foreign divorce decrees after domestication. The superior court properly exercised authority to enforce the Tennessee child support order because Kerr did not challenge the Tennessee court's jurisdiction or his notice and opportunity to be heard.
• Under OCGA § 19-9-85(d), a person seeking to contest the validity of a registered order must request a hearing within 20 days after service of the notice. If a timely request for a hearing is not made, the registration is confirmed as a matter of law under § 19-9-85(e). However, this provision only applies to orders registered pursuant to § 19-9-85(a). Since the filing here did not meet the requirements for registration under § 19-9-85(a) (only one certified copy instead of two), the automatic confirmation provision of § 19-9-85(e) did not apply.

Precedent Name

• Deese v. Deese
• Roehl v. O'Keefe
• Gallemore v. White
• Jones v. Foster
• Pearson v. Pearson
• Ross v. Ross
• McGowan v. McGowan
• Dept. of Human Resources v. Fenner

Cited Statute

• United States Code
• Official Code of Georgia Annotated

Judge Name

• P. J. Miller
• Senior Appellate Judge Phipps
• Judge Mercier

Passage Text

• Because this appeal draws into question the transcript of the proceedings, it was [Kerr's] duty to have the transcript prepared so that it could be included in the record. See OCGA § 5-6-41 (c). Because [Kerr] failed to attach the transcript of the hearing, it is not possible for this Court to determine whether this issue was properly preserved. In the absence of a transcript of a hearing, we must presume that the evidence supports the trial court's findings.
• In order to validly register a child custody order, a litigant must file: (1) A letter or other document requesting registration; (2) Two copies, including one certified copy, of the determination sought to be registered, and a statement under penalty of perjury that to the best of the knowledge and belief of the person seeking registration the order has not been modified; and (3) Except as otherwise provided in Code Section 19-9-69, the name and address of the person seeking registration and any parent or person acting as a parent who has been awarded custody or visitation in the child custody determination sought to be registered. OCGA § 19-9-85 (a).
• Although not specifically enumerated as error, Kerr alleges that the superior court erred by awarding attorney fees to Wilson. Kerr is correct in that the superior court's order did not specify a statutory basis for the fees and contained no factual findings necessary to support the award. Accordingly, the award of attorney fees must be vacated and the case remanded to the trial court so that the necessary findings may be made.