Jonathan Smith V Marksman Security Corporation

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Automated Summary

Key Facts

Plaintiff Jonathan Smith, a white man employed by Defendant Marksman Security Corporation since September 2019 as an Armed Security Officer, alleges race discrimination and retaliation. Plaintiff claims he was harassed by an African American manager who accused him of racism after discovering his wife is African American. In September 2022, Plaintiff was called into a meeting regarding offensive comments his subordinates made, then transferred, demoted, and ultimately terminated for refusing the transfer. The Court granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss because Plaintiff failed to adequately allege he was qualified as a supervisor, failed to allege similarly situated individuals were treated differently, and failed to establish a causal connection between alleged protected activity and termination due to the two-year gap.

Issues

  • The Court finds that calling Plaintiff 'racist' is not racial on its face and is not related to Plaintiff's race. Even if such comments could be construed as verbal conduct based on a protected characteristic, they were not objectively offensive as a matter of law. The comments were limited and occurred over an indefinite period of time, insufficient to create a plausible hostile work environment claim under Title VII.
  • The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege that his termination was unlawful discrimination due to his protected status as a white man. He does not allege that he was qualified as a supervisor at the time of his termination, nor does he allege that other similarly situated supervisors were not demoted when he was. The First Amended Complaint indicates he was terminated because he made offensive comments to his subordinates and refused to accept a transfer, rather than due to protected status.
  • The plaintiff's retaliation claim fails because he cannot establish a causal connection between his protected activity and the adverse employment action. The two-year gap between the HR meeting and his demotion is too extended to support an inference of causation, and the complaint does not allege that the meeting was related to the termination.
  • The Court will not provide leave to amend. Plaintiff has already amended his complaint once. There are no additional facts that Plaintiff has proffered that could establish sufficiently pervasive conduct to constitute a hostile work environment claim, and Plaintiff cannot amend to reduce the two-year gap between the alleged protected activity and his termination.

Holdings

  • The Court grants Defendant Marksman Security Corporation's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 18) because Plaintiff failed to adequately allege qualified supervisor status, failed to allege similarly situated individuals were treated differently, and failed to establish a causal connection between protected activity and adverse employment action. The Court denies leave to amend as the complaint cannot be cured by additional facts.
  • The Court denies Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 10) as moot. The Clerk of Court is instructed to close the case.

Remedies

The Court granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 18), dismissing the Plaintiff's claims. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 10) was denied as moot. The Clerk of Court is instructed to close this case.

Legal Principles

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Under Twombly and Iqbal, the plaintiff must allege non-conclusory facts that, together with reasonable inferences, are plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief. For Title VII discrimination claims, plaintiffs must show (1) membership in a protected class, (2) qualification for position, (3) adverse employment action, and (4) similarly situated individuals outside protected class treated more favorably. For hostile work environment claims, conduct must be both objectively and subjectively offensive, sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter employment conditions. For retaliation claims, plaintiffs must prove protected activity, adverse employment action, and causal connection between the two.

Precedent Name

  • Dawson v. Entek Int'l
  • Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc.
  • Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc.
  • Surrell v. Cal. Water Serv. Co.
  • Faragher v. City of Boca Raton
  • McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
  • Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden
  • Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv.
  • Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters.
  • Vasquez v. Cnty. of L.A.
  • Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co.
  • Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly
  • Ashcroft v. Iqbal
  • Kendall v. Visa U.S.A., Inc.
  • Faulkner v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc.
  • Westendorf v. W. Coast Contractors of Nev., Inc.

Cited Statute

  • Civil Rights Act of 1964 Title VII
  • Nevada Revised Statutes Chapter 613
  • Nevada Revised Statutes 613.330

Judge Name

Richard F. Boulware, II

Passage Text

  • In fact, 'simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious)' are not sufficient to create an actionable claim under Title VII. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, there are no allegations providing repeated examples of unwelcome conduct and no allegations that these comments occurred over an extended period of time. Because the comments were limited and occurred over an indefinite period of time, they do not state a plausible hostile work environment claim under Title VII.
  • Cases that accept mere temporal proximity—between an employer's knowledge of protected activity and an adverse employment action—as sufficient evidence of causality uniformly hold that the temporal proximity must be 'very close.' Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273–274 (2001); see also Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1068 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that a gap of ten months between the protected action and the termination did not give rise to an inference of causation). Two years is too extended a gap for the Court to find that Plaintiff has sufficiently pled a causal connection between the HR meeting and his demotion.
  • Overall, Plaintiff has failed to allege that his termination was unlawful discrimination due to his protected status as a white man. He does not allege that he was qualified as a supervisor. He does not allege that other supervisors were not demoted when he was. Instead, the First Amended Complaint provides that he was terminated because he made offensive comments to his subordinates and refused to accept a transfer. The Court therefore grants Defendant's motion to dismiss.