Mitchell V Reddington Structural Solutions Llc

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Key Facts

The court denied Plaintiff Daniel Mitchell's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Preliminary Injunction without prejudice, finding he failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits for his trademark infringement and related claims. The court also denied Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Defendants' response (ECF No. 34) and required Defendants to file their Motion to Dismiss separately on the docket. Plaintiff must comply with Local Rule 10-5 for his sealed appendix of exhibits by June 13, 2025, or face unsealing. The case involves allegations that Defendants (Reddington Structural Solutions, LLC, et al.) infringed Kolay trademarks (Registration Nos. 5661477 and 5661478) and engaged in tortious interference, conversion, and civil conspiracy.

Issues

  • The Court dismissed Plaintiff's conversion claim, citing precedent in the 9th Circuit that trademark infringement does not constitute conversion. Legal authorities such as McZeal v. Amazon Services and McCarthy on Trademarks explicitly reject this theory.
  • The Court denied Plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, finding he failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits. This determination was based on the rejection of all six claims, fulfilling the threshold requirement under Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council.
  • Plaintiff's tortious interference with economic advantage claim failed as the alleged contracts were with Kolay, not him personally. Nevada law requires the claim to involve a prospective relationship between the plaintiff and third parties, which was not established here.
  • The Court denied Plaintiff's federal trademark infringement claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1114, finding he failed to demonstrate Defendants used the 'Kolay' mark on their products or that such use would likely confuse consumers. While Plaintiff claimed Defendants used the mark on Reddington flooring, attached evidence showed no such use, and Defendants provided photos of their products without the mark.
  • Plaintiff's civil conspiracy claim was dismissed as it required an underlying tort (trademark infringement), which is not recognized as a tort in Nevada. The Court noted that trademark infringement is a statutory violation, not a tort, invalidating the conspiracy theory.
  • The Court rejected Plaintiff's unfair competition claim under the Lanham Act, aligning with the trademark infringement analysis. Defendants' rebuttal evidence, including product photos without the 'Kolay' mark, negated any likelihood of public deception or confusion required for the claim.

Holdings

  • The court denied Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 30) without prejudice, finding that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of his trademark infringement, unfair competition, tortious interference with economic advantage, conversion, and civil conspiracy claims.
  • The court denied Plaintiff's Motion to Strike (ECF No. 34) because Defendants' response to the TRO motion was valid and should not be stricken.
  • Defendants were ordered to file their Motion to Dismiss separately on the docket, as required by Local Rule IC 2-2(b). The briefing timeline will be determined by the filing date of the Motion to Dismiss.
  • Plaintiff was required to comply with Local Rule 10-5 for his Sealed Appendix of Exhibits (ECF No. 31) by June 13, 2025. Failure to comply will result in the Court unsealing the Appendix.

Legal Principles

The court applied the four-factor Winter test for preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders, requiring a plaintiff to demonstrate (1) likelihood of success on the merits, (2) likelihood of irreparable harm, (3) balance of equities tipping in the plaintiff's favor, and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. The court denied relief as the plaintiff failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits for any of his claims.

Precedent Name

  • A.L.M.N., Inc. v. Rosoff
  • GES, Inc. v. Corbitt
  • McZeal v. Amazon Services, LLC
  • Consolidated Generator-Nevada, Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co., Inc.
  • Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts

Cited Statute

  • Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114
  • Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a)

Judge Name

Gloria M. Navarro

Passage Text

  • Plaintiff's tortious interference with economic advantage claim suffers from a threshold problem—the potential contractual relationships would have been with Kolay, not Plaintiff, while the elements of the claim specifically require 'a prospective contractual relationship between plaintiff and a third party.'
  • Plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence to support a finding that Defendants have actually used the mark, or anything that could be confused with the mark. Plaintiff states in his Motion for TRO and Declaration that Defendants used the 'KOLAY' mark on their Reddington flooring products. But he attaches no additional evidence of the use of the word 'Kolay' on Reddington's products.
  • Courts in this circuit have rejected the argument that a trademark can be 'converted.' See, e.g., McZeal v. Amazon Services, LLC, 2021 WL 5213099, *4 (C.D. Cal. 2021) ('Plaintiff's claim for conversion of his trademark is not actionable and must also be dismissed.')