Hessel V Board Of Parole

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Key Facts

This case involves Brian Douglas Hessel's petition for judicial review of the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision's final order deferring his projected parole release date for 48 months. The Board found Hessel suffers from a present severe emotional disturbance (PSED) that constitutes a danger to the health or safety of the community under ORS 144.125(3). The psychological evaluation diagnosed him with narcissistic personality disorder, noting deficits in insight, increased hostility to women, and elevated risk for sexual recidivism. The Court of Appeals of Oregon affirmed the Board's decision, rejecting Hessel's claims that the deferral violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and Due Process Clause.

Issues

  • The court reviews the Board of Parole's finding that petitioner suffers from a present severe emotional disturbance (PSED) that constitutes a danger to the health or safety of the community under ORS 144.125(3). The court examines whether the record provides substantial evidence for this finding and whether the board's decision meets the substantial reason standard required by ORS 144.335(3) and ORS 183.482(8), deferring to the board's reasonable inferences without reweighing the evidence.
  • The petitioner contends that ORS 144.125(3) (1989) violates Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by impermissibly discriminating against people with disabilities. The petitioner argues that the statutory scheme permits the board to delay release only of dangerous inmates who have an emotional disorder, making the emotional disorder a prerequisite to the board's consideration of whether statutory criteria have been met. The court must determine whether this argument is plainly wrong given prior Oregon Court of Appeals decisions.

Holdings

The Court of Appeals affirmed the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision's order deferring petitioner's projected parole release date for 48 months. The court found substantial evidence that petitioner's present severe emotional disturbance (PSED) constituted a danger to the health or safety of the community, which permits deferral under ORS 144.125(3). The court rejected petitioner's ADA and Rehabilitation Act challenges to the statute, holding that dangerousness—even dangerousness resulting from a disability—can be a basis for deferring release, and that the board's decision was based on dangerousness rather than disability. The court also declined to address petitioner's undeveloped due process argument.

Remedies

The Court of Appeals of the State of Oregon affirmed the final order of the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision deferring petitioner's projected parole release date for 48 months based on a finding of present severe emotional disturbance constituting a danger to the health or safety of the community under ORS 144.125(3).

Legal Principles

The court affirmed the Board of Parole's decision using the substantial evidence and substantial reason standard of review (ORS 144.335(3); ORS 183.482(8)). The court deferred to the board's reasonable inferences without reweighing evidence, noting that the board may order postponement of parole release if a psychiatric or psychological diagnosis of PSED constitutes danger to the health or safety of the community. The court also applied stare decisis principles, declining to overrule prior cases (Green, Grimm, McCline) that upheld similar ADA and RA challenges without demonstrating those cases were plainly wrong.

Precedent Name

  • Schroeder v. Board of Parole (2024)
  • Green v. Board of Parole
  • McCline v. Board of Parole
  • Grimm v. Board of Parole
  • Peek v. Thompson
  • State v. Civil
  • Schroeder v. Board of Parole (2021)
  • Mendacino v. Board of Parole

Cited Statute

  • Oregon Revised Statutes governing Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision
  • Oregon Revised Statutes governing judicial review standards
  • Rehabilitation Act of 1973
  • Americans with Disabilities Act Title II

Judge Name

  • Jacquot
  • Tookey
  • Kamins

Passage Text

  • If after consideration of all relevant facts, including a psychiatric or psychological report, the Board determines that the prisoner will be a danger to the health or safety of the community, it may postpone or deny parole. But the Board may not deny release on parole solely because of a prisoner's severe emotional disturbance.
  • Although petitioner here argues that only individuals with disabilities are considered at that stage of the board's analysis, nothing has changed in the intervening years since Green or McCline to demonstrate that the board is basing its decision on disability, as opposed to dangerousness.
  • The record provides substantial evidence for the board's finding that petitioner's emotional disturbance was severe and constituted a danger to the community. Under the governing law at the time of petitioner's conviction, the board may order the postponement of a scheduled parole release if a psychiatric or psychological diagnosis of PSED such as to constitute a danger to the health or safety of the community has been made with respect to petitioner.