Alexander V Lnu

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Automated Summary

Key Facts

William Paul Alexander, serving a life sentence plus 36 years in New Mexico custody, filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his convictions for first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, kidnapping, and tampering with evidence arising from the August 2015 death of Tiffany Boyer. Alexander raised multiple grounds including double jeopardy violations due to jury confusion on alternative counts, insufficient evidence for kidnapping convictions, and ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. The state court vacated some alternative charges including felony murder and conspiracy to commit felony murder. The magistrate judge has reviewed the record and recommends denying the entire petition with prejudice.

Issues

  • Alexander claims appellate counsel was ineffective for declining phone calls or visits and for failing to include ineffective assistance of trial counsel complaints in the appellate brief. The court found these bare assertions failed to demonstrate deficient performance or prejudice under Strickland, particularly given the lack of merit in the underlying trial ineffectiveness claims.
  • Alexander asserts an actual innocence claim based on (1) no direct evidence against him, (2) accomplice testimony establishing Stepp's responsibility for the murder, and (3) forensic anthropologist testimony not supporting hammer-based killing. The court denied this claim, noting the Supreme Court has never recognized freestanding actual innocence claims as a basis for federal habeas relief absent an independent constitutional violation.
  • Alexander contends there was insufficient evidence to prove his intent to commit kidnapping and to support the conspiracy to commit kidnapping convictions. The court applied the Jackson v. Virginia standard, viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, and found the state court's assessment that a rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond reasonable doubt was objectively reasonable under AEDPA deference.
  • Alexander alleges trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately communicate (visiting twice in two years), failing to investigate alibi witnesses or Stepp's alleged Facebook admission of guilt, and failing to call defense witnesses including Detective Koppman. The court applied the Strickland standard, finding counsel's performance did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness and did not prejudice the defense.
  • Petitioner Alexander argues that the jury's return of guilty verdicts on both Count 1 (willful and deliberate first-degree murder) and the alternative (felony murder) constitutes double jeopardy and due process violations due to juror confusion. The court analyzed whether the state court's decision to vacate the felony murder conviction while affirming the murder conviction was reasonable under federal law.
  • Alexander asserts a double jeopardy violation because he was convicted of both first-degree murder and kidnapping, where kidnapping was the predicate felony used for the felony murder charge. The court examined whether the New Mexico Supreme Court's conclusion that vacating the felony murder conviction negated any double jeopardy concerns was reasonable or contrary to federal law.

Holdings

  • The magistrate judge recommends denying with prejudice the entire Amended Petition filed by petitioner William Paul Alexander under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The court found that Alexander's claims lack merit across all grounds, including double jeopardy and due process violations, ineffective assistance of counsel claims, and actual innocence claims. The court applied the highly deferential AEDPA standard and determined the state court's adjudications were not contrary to or involved unreasonable applications of clearly established federal law.
  • Regarding Ground 10 (actual innocence claim), the court denied the petition because the Supreme Court has never recognized freestanding actual innocence claims as a basis for federal habeas relief. Additionally, the state court reasonably rejected Alexander's arguments regarding alibi witnesses, accomplice testimony, and forensic anthropologist testimony, finding they amounted to disputes about the weight of evidence rather than constitutional violations.
  • Regarding Grounds 4 and 6 (due process claims re: kidnapping-related convictions), the court denied the petition because sufficient evidence supported the kidnapping convictions under an accomplice liability theory. The New Mexico Supreme Court reasonably concluded that Alexander's statements and behavior upon arriving at the house established intent to approve the kidnapping, and the conspiracy to commit kidnapping conviction was already vacated by the trial court.
  • Regarding Grounds 1-3 (double jeopardy and due process claims), the court denied Alexander's petition because the New Mexico Supreme Court properly vacated the duplicative felony murder conviction, negating double jeopardy concerns. The court found no evidence of juror confusion or ambiguity requiring vacatur of both murder and kidnapping convictions, as the conduct underlying these offenses was not unitary.
  • Regarding Grounds 7 and 8 (ineffective assistance of counsel claims), the court denied the petition because Alexander failed to show that his trial or appellate counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or that deficient performance prejudiced the defense. The state habeas court's findings regarding inadequate communication, failure to investigate alibi witnesses, failure to call defense witnesses, and failure to raise ineffective counsel arguments on appeal were not unreasonable or contrary to law.

Remedies

The magistrate judge recommends denying with prejudice the entire Amended Petition filed by William Paul Alexander under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody. The court finds that Alexander's claims lack merit across all grounds including double jeopardy, due process violations, ineffective assistance of counsel, and actual innocence claims.

Legal Principles

  • The 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) standard as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 governs habeas petitions. The Court's review of state court decisions is highly deferential. Habeas relief under § 2254(d) is not available unless the state court decision was contrary to clearly established federal law or based on an unreasonable determination of facts. The Jackson v. Virginia standard applies to sufficiency of evidence claims, requiring the court to view evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine if any rational trier of fact could have found essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. For ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the Strickland standard requires showing counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.
  • The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, applicable to states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that no person shall be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. Double jeopardy may arise when a defendant is subjected to multiple punishments for the same offense. The court vacated the felony murder conviction to resolve double jeopardy concerns where the jury returned multiple guilty verdicts based on alternative theories of the same offense, which is proper so long as the defendant is not subject to multiple punishments.

Precedent Name

  • Farrar v. Raemisch
  • Strickland v. Washington
  • Meek v. Martin
  • State v. Phillips
  • Neill v. Gibson
  • Brown v. Sirmons
  • State v. Montoya
  • State v. Torres
  • Herrera v. Collins
  • Coleman v. Johnson
  • Branch v. New Mexico
  • Lisenba v. California
  • State v. Sanchez
  • Hall v. Bellmon
  • Ramirez v. Cent. N.M. Corr. Fac.
  • Hooks v. Workman
  • United States v. Bernard
  • Cavazos v. Smith
  • Jackson v. Virginia
  • Lott v. Trammell
  • State v. Galindo
  • Cortez-Lazcano v. Whitten
  • Messer v. Roberts

Cited Statute

  • 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) governs objections to magistrate judge recommendations
  • N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-2-1(A)(1) defines willful and deliberate first-degree murder
  • N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-1-13 describes accessory liability
  • U.S. Const. amend. V Double Jeopardy Clause
  • 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
  • N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-4-1(A)(4) defines kidnapping

Judge Name

Damian L. Martinez

Passage Text

  • Yet the United States Supreme Court has never recognized freestanding actual innocence claims as a basis for federal habeas relief. To the contrary, the Court has repeatedly rejected such claims, noting instead that 'claims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence have never been held to state a ground for federal habeas relief absent an independent constitutional violation occurring in the underlying state criminal proceedings.'
  • The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that 'no person shall... be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.' Alexander did not receive multiple punishments for the same offense, because the state court vacated the felony murder conviction.
  • IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court deny with prejudice the entire Amended Petition.