Automated Summary
Key Facts
The applicant, Ms Coxon, commenced employment in 1995 and raised a justified grievance regarding training, leading to a departmental transfer. Subsequent events included raising sex discrimination issues via a 10 October memo and 13 October email, resulting in a three-day suspension on 14 October 1997. A disciplinary meeting was held on 20 October, with dismissal for gross misconduct on 22 October 1997 citing breach of trust and behavioral issues. No specific allegations were provided before the disciplinary hearing, and the dismissal letter summarized reasons without details.
Issues
- The Appellant argues that she was led to believe the fairness of her dismissal would not be in issue during the Tribunal hearing, based on a letter from the respondent and prior directions. She contends this procedural misstep prejudiced her case.
- The Appellant claims the Tribunal's equal pay ruling was insufficient, as it did not detail the job functions of her comparator or provide adequate reasoning for its conclusion, leaving the basis of the decision unclear.
- The Appellant alleges her dismissal was a retaliatory act of victimisation, citing a sequence of events where her prior complaints of sex discrimination (emails, letters) were factored into the disciplinary process, which the Tribunal failed to properly consider.
- The Appellant asserts that the Employment Tribunal did not make proper findings regarding the specific acts of gross misconduct that led to her dismissal, relying instead on vague references to a 'breakdown of relations' and procedural unfairness.
Holdings
- The appeal against the Second Tribunal Decision is dismissed. The Employment Appeal Tribunal found no reasonably arguable point of law to challenge the conclusions reached by the Second Tribunal, which dismissed the complaints due to overlap with prior decisions and procedural grounds.
- The appeal against the First Tribunal Decision is allowed in part. The Appellant's claims of unfair dismissal, victimisation, and equal pay can proceed to a full hearing as they raise arguable points of law. However, the sex discrimination complaints are dismissed as the Tribunal's decision to rule them out of time is upheld.
Remedies
- The appeal against the second Tribunal decision is dismissed as it does not raise any reasonably arguable points of law.
- The appeal against the first Tribunal decision regarding unfair dismissal, victimisation, and equal pay claims is allowed to proceed. The sex discrimination complaints are dismissed.
Legal Principles
- The Employment Appeal Tribunal considered the principle of natural justice in relation to procedural fairness during the disciplinary process. The Appellant argued she was denied natural justice as she was not adequately informed of the charges against her, and the Tribunal's reliance on the appeal process to cure procedural defects was challenged. The Tribunal acknowledged this as an arguable point of law.
- The principle of Res Judicata was applied in dismissing the second appeal. The Tribunal held that complaints raised in the second Employment Tribunal were barred as they overlapped with issues already considered in the first decision, and no new arguable points of law were identified.
Precedent Name
Henderson v Henderson
Cited Statute
Sex Discrimination Act 1975
Judge Name
- Miss Recorder Elizabeth Slade QC
- Mr I Ezekiel
- Ms G Mills
Passage Text
- Following the meeting on Monday, reached a decision based on no one event in isolation, looked at the broader picture and do not feel possible to continue the working relationship. Dismissal on grounds of breach of trust, do not consider working relationship is viable with both existing previous managers, overall behaviour and attitude towards company not at a level we expect.
- In our view that argument is misconceived and we can see no basis upon which the Tribunal's decision to rule those complaints out of time can be attacked. Accordingly we dismiss the appeal in so far as it relates to complaints of sex discrimination.
- Third, so far as the allegation that the finding that the dismissal was fair, was perverse is concerned, in our view there is some force in the contention that the absence of prior notification of the precise charges... are all matters which can properly be relied upon by the Appellant to attack the conclusion of the Employment Tribunal that the dismissal was a fair dismissal as perverse.