Infante V Namecheap Incorporated

Key Facts

Transaction Type

Issues

• Whether Plaintiff Afonso Infante is likely to succeed on the merits of his breach of contract claim against Defendant Namecheap Incorporated for suspending six domain names, which would entitle him to a temporary restraining order for immediate reinstatement of the domains and enjoining further interference.
• Whether Defendant Namecheap Incorporated is entitled to attorney's fees and costs under Arizona Revised Statutes § 12-341.01 as the successful party in this action, given that Plaintiff's breach of contract claim has not been dismissed and Defendant has not yet prevailed.
• Whether the Court may take judicial notice of Ms. Rallonza's Civil Harassment Restraining Order Request and the factual allegations contained within, given that the facts are heavily disputed and the Court can only notice the existence of legal documents, not disputed facts.

Holdings

Remedies

Legal Principles

• Plaintiff alleges breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing under Nevada law as one of five claims in original Complaint. Only breach of contract claim proceeded after screening; other claims were dismissed or require separate screening.
• The movant carries the burden of proof on each element of the preliminary injunction test including likelihood of success on merits, irreparable harm, equities, and public interest. Courts must balance competing claims of injury and consider public consequences of granting injunctive relief.
• The court applies the standard Winter factors for preliminary injunctive relief (likelihood of success on merits, irreparable harm, equities, public interest). The Ninth Circuit employs a sliding scale approach where elements can be balanced. TROs should preserve status quo pending hearing and are extraordinary remedies not awarded as of right. The movant carries the burden of proof on each element.
• The court analyzes whether Defendant breached the Registration Agreement. Arizona courts construe contract provisions from plain language and unambiguous terms must be applied as written. The Agreement allows termination/suspension for cause including material allegations of illegal conduct.

Precedent Name

• Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Brown
• Smith v. Melson, Inc.
• Ariz. Recovery Housing Ass'n v. Ariz. Dep't of Health Servs.
• Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.
• Candrian v. RS Indus., Inc.
• Washington v. Trump
• All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell

Key Disputed Contract Clauses

• Section 4 of the Registration Agreement between Plaintiff Afonso Infante and Defendant Namecheap Incorporated provides that Namecheap may terminate or suspend services at any time for cause, which without limitation includes material allegations of illegal conduct. Plaintiff argued the Agreement only permits suspension for enumerated grounds such as non-payment, clear policy abuse, binding legal order, or material allegations of illegal conduct, and that Defendant identified no such grounds. Plaintiff also claimed Defendant suspended domains without notice, violating the Agreement's notice requirements. Defendant argued the plain language of the Agreement allows suspension based on material allegations of illegal conduct from the California Civil Harassment Restraining Order against Plaintiff.
• Plaintiff argued that Defendant suspended his domain names without notice in defiance of the Agreement's notice requirements. Plaintiff referenced the ICANN Registrar Accreditation Agreement provision requiring registrars to give registrants reasonable time to respond before taking action. However, the Court noted this provision does not appear to be adopted in the specific Agreement at issue. The Registration Agreement at issue provides broad authority to terminate or suspend services for cause without explicit notice requirements.

Cited Statute

• Attorney's Fees Statute
• Unfair Competition Law
• Appeal Stay
• In forma pauperis status
• Declaratory Judgment

Judge Name

Passage Text

• The Agreement provides that Defendant may terminate or suspend the Service(s) at any time for cause, which, without limitation, includes material allegations of illegal conduct. Ms. Rallonza filed a request for a CHRO wherein she alleged that Plaintiff harassed her. A California state court granted her a CHRO until June of 2030. The CHRO specifically mandates that Plaintiff must not create, maintain, publish, advertise any website or other social media content containing intimate images of protected party Vanessa Rallonza.
• IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's TRO Motion (Doc. 2) is DENIED and the TRO Hearing set for Friday, August 1, 2025, is VACATED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's request for Attorney's Fees (Doc. 18 at 9) is DENIED without prejudice.
• The Court finds that Plaintiff is not likely to succeed on the merits of his breach of contract claim because Section 4 of the Agreement expressly provides that Namecheap may terminate or suspend the Service(s) at any time for cause, which includes material allegations of illegal conduct. The Court agrees that Plaintiff is not likely to succeed on the merits of his breach of contract claim, therefore, he is not entitled to a TRO.

Damages / Relief Type

• Plaintiff sought temporary restraining order for immediate reinstatement of six suspended domain names and enjoining Defendant from further interference
• Defendant sought attorney's fees and costs under A.R.S. § 12-341.01
• Plaintiff sought declaratory judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 2201.1