Marinvest SRL v Messina and Others (LM122OCT19) [2020] ZACT 89 (24 August 2020)

Saflii

Automated Summary

Key Facts

The Competition Tribunal conditionally approved Marinvest S.r.l.'s acquisition of Ignazio Messina & C.S.p.A and RORO Italia S.r.l. due to the target firms' severe financial difficulties and risk of liquidation. The merger creates a near-monopoly (85-95% market share) in container liner shipping services on South Africa to/from East Africa routes. Behavioral remedies including operational ring-fencing and enhanced monitoring conditions were imposed to address competition concerns while preserving jobs and supplier relationships for three years post-transaction.

Issues

  • The main legal issue was determining if the proposed merger between Marinvest and IM/SPV would substantially lessen competition in the container liner shipping services market on South Africa to East Africa routes, given their combined near monopoly position (85-95% market share) and whether the tendered behavioral remedies (ring-fencing) are effective in addressing these structural competition concerns.
  • The Tribunal raised concerns about the Commission's failure to prior to its recommendation test the proposed behavioural remedies with third parties, including customers and competitors who expressed competition concerns, and whether the subsequent customer feedback (e.g., Sasol's nuanced support) justified approval with modified conditions.
  • The Tribunal evaluated public interest factors such as the preservation of [confidential] South African jobs at risk of retrenchment due to the target firms' financial difficulties, and the continuation of existing supplier agreements with South African SMEs for three years post-transaction, alongside competition concerns.

Holdings

The Competition Tribunal conditionally approved the proposed merger between Marinvest S.r.l. and Ignazio Messina & C.S.p.A/RORO Italia S.r.l., subject to 'ring-fencing' conditions and public interest requirements. The approval was based on the Commission's finding that the target firms face severe financial difficulties and likely liquidation without the transaction, despite competition concerns on the South Africa to/from East Africa routes. The Tribunal imposed monitoring conditions, altered the variation clause to allow the Commission to request amendments, and required no merger-specific retrenchments and continued use of existing South African suppliers for three years post-transaction.

Remedies

  • The IM South Africa Business shall exercise, in its sole discretion, final and determinative power regarding the strategic marketing and/or pricing policies of IM's South African Operations and will operate the South African Operations in the Ordinary Course of Business independently of MSC.
  • MSC and IM shall ensure that none of the MSC representatives (or representatives of MSC affiliate companies) appointed to the board of directors of IM shall be engaged in the direct day-to-day management of the IM South Africa Business.
  • The IM South Africa Business will be kept separate from the MSC South Africa Business and no steps will be taken to integrate or otherwise align the activities or conduct of IM and MSC's respective South African Operations.
  • The day-to-day affairs and business of IM's South African Operations shall be managed by IM, in accordance with its business trading policies and practices as at the Closing Date, except as may be necessary to comply with any changes in applicable law or good industry practice.
  • MSC and IM shall establish 'information barriers' between the operations of the IM South Africa Business on the one hand, and MSC, on the other hand.
  • MSC and IM shall ensure that no Competitively Sensitive Non-Public Information of the IM South Africa Business are discussed at IM board meetings unless the MSC board representatives (or representatives of MSC affiliate companies) first recuse themselves from such discussion.

Legal Principles

The Tribunal applied principles of competition law analysis, including assessment of market concentration, behavioral remedies (ring-fencing conditions), and public interest considerations (employment and supplier obligations) to justify conditional approval of the merger.

Precedent Name

COMESA conditional approval of the proposed transaction

Judge Name

  • Yasmin Carrim
  • AW Wessels
  • Prof. Fiona Tregenna

Passage Text

  • The Tribunal has reservations about the effectiveness of the tendered behavioural remedies as a means to address the significant competition concerns resulting from the proposed transaction in relation to container liner shipping services to / from South Africa and East Africa. We decided to conditionally approve the proposed transaction mainly based on the Commission's finding regarding the relevant counterfactual i.e. that the target firms have severe financial difficulties and that they are likely to be liquidated if the proposed transaction is not implemented.
  • The Commission further noted that the proposed transaction raises a structural competition concern in relation to the SAF to / from EAF routes. It said that typically it would not consider behavioural remedies to address a structural competition problem but that in this case it accepted the merger parties' tendered behavioural remedies in the context of the relevant counterfactual of the target firms likely being liquidated absent the proposed merger.
  • The altered variation clause states: 'The Commission, IM or MSC (or MSC affiliate companies) may at any time, on good cause shown, apply to the Tribunal for the Conditions to be lifted, revised or amended.'