Automated Summary
Key Facts
The case centers on a dispute regarding the 120-day rule for serving summons under Puerto Rico Civil Procedure Rules. Humacar, Inc. filed a third-party demand against additional defendants in July 2025 but failed to serve the summons until November 2025, 137 days later. The petitioner argued the lower court erred by allowing service beyond the 120-day limit, asserting the demand should have been automatically dismissed. The appellate court agreed, holding that the 120-day period began when the third-party demand was filed and that Humacar's inaction warranted dismissal without prejudice.
Issues
- The court addressed whether the Tribunal de Primera Instancia (TPI) erred by ordering the expedición of emplazamientos against third-party defendants 137 days after the third-party demand was filed, exceeding the 120-day period specified in Rule 4.3(c) of the Procedimiento Civil. The petitioner argued that the TPI failed to apply precedents requiring automatic dismissal when this period is breached, as Humacar delayed submitting summons forms and the TPI did not account for this procedural failure.
- The second issue involved the TPI's failure to apply relevant precedents, including Banco de Desarrollo económico v. AMC Surgery and Bernier González v. Rodríguez Becerra, which mandate automatic dismissal of actions when the 120-day summons period under Rule 4.3(c) is exceeded. The petitioner contended that the TPI's decision to allow the summons after 137 days violated these rulings, as the delay stemmed from Humacar's inaction rather than the court's processing delays.
Holdings
The court granted certiorari and revoked the lower court's order, dismissing the third-party demand without prejudice due to non-compliance with the 120-day summons service period under Rule 4.3(c) of the Civil Procedure Rules. The court held that the 120-day period is inextensible and began when Humacar filed the third-party demand, as they failed to present the summons forms and did not request a proper extension.
Remedies
- El Tribunal expide el auto de certiorari y revoca la Orden emitida por el Tribunal de Primera Instancia.
- La 'Demanda contra Terceros' presentada por Humacar es desestimada sin perjuicio.
Legal Principles
The court applied the inextensible 120-day rule for serving summons under Rule 4.3(c) of the Civil Procedure, emphasizing that the period begins when the summons is issued by the court's secretary and cannot be extended unless delays are attributable to the court's secretary. This principle was reinforced through precedents like Bernier González v. Rodríguez Becerra and Pérez Quiles v. Santiago Cintrón, which clarified that the 120-day deadline is strict and not subject to judicial discretion once the summons is issued.
Precedent Name
- Ross Valedón v. Hospital Dr. Susoni Health Community Services, Corp.
- First Bank of P.R. v. Inmob. Nac. Inc.
- Sánchez Rodríguez v. Adm. de Corrección
- Banco de Desarrollo económico v. AMC Surgery
- Pérez Quiles v. Santiago Cintrón
- Sánchez Ruiz v. Higuera Pérez
- Bernier González v. Rodríguez Becerra
Cited Statute
Reglas de Procedimiento Civil
Judge Name
- Judge Monge Gómez
- Judge Prats Palerm
- Judge Rivera Colón
Passage Text
- Consecuentemente, procedía la desestimación automática de la 'Demanda contra Terceros', sin perjuicio, por ser el primer incumplimiento de la parte recurrida con el término de 120 días establecido.
- Es menester destacar que durante cuatro (4) meses Humacar no procuró gestión alguna para que se procediera a expedir los emplazamientos. Ciertamente, coincidimos con el Peticionario a los efectos de que el Recurrido se cruzó totalmente de brazos al no realizar gestión alguna dirigida a solicitar la expedición de los emplazamientos dentro del término de 120 días dispuesto en la Regla 4.3 (c) de Procedimiento Civil, supra.
- Por tanto, la casuística reseñada nos lleva a concluir que, en este caso, el punto de partida para contabilizar el plazo de ciento veinte (120) días comenzó el 3 de julio de 2025, cuando se presentó la 'Demanda contra Terceros' y no cuando el Recurrido presentó los formularios de emplazamientos. Esto porque la tardanza en presentar los mismos se debió a la propia conducta de Humacar al no ser diligente con la tramitación de su causa de acción en contra de los terceros demandados.