Van Zyl N.O. v Road Accident Fund (CCT 114/20) [2021] ZACC 44; 2022 (2) BCLR 215 (CC); 2022 (3) SA 45 (CC) (19 November 2021)

Key Facts

Issues

• The court examined if section 23 of the Road Accident Fund Act (RAF Act) suspends the running of prescription for affected persons (those with mental disabilities not under curatorship or detention). This includes determining whether the RAF Act's provisions on prescription are exclusive or if the Prescription Act's section 13(1) complements it.
• The court considered the application of the common law impossibility principle, which states that the law does not compel impossible actions. This was evaluated to determine if it could save Mr. Jacobs' claim from prescription, given his mental incapacity to act.
• The fourth issue involved assessing if South Africa's international obligations under the CRPD require the RAF Act to be interpreted in a way that protects the rights of persons with disabilities, particularly their access to courts and legal capacity.
• The second issue addressed whether the Prescription Act's section 13(1), which delays prescription for persons with mental disabilities, applies to claims under the RAF Act. This involved assessing if the two laws can coexist or if the RAF Act's section 23 exclusively governs prescription for road accident claims.

Holdings

• The Constitutional Court granted the applicant leave to appeal the Supreme Court of Appeal's decision, which upheld the Road Accident Fund's (RAF) special plea of prescription. The Court found that the RAF Act's provisions on prescription were inconsistent with the Prescription Act and common law principles of natural justice, particularly the impossibility principle. The Court held that the RAF Act cannot be interpreted to exclude the application of the impossibility principle, which suspends prescription for claimants who, due to no fault of their own, find it impossible to comply with statutory time limits.
• The respondent (RAF) was ordered to pay the applicant's costs in the High Court, Supreme Court of Appeal, and Constitutional Court, with the costs in the Constitutional Court including the fees of two counsel. This cost order reflects the Court's determination that the applicant succeeded in her appeal and that the RAF's defense of prescription was not justified under the Constitution or common law.
• The special plea of prescription raised by the RAF was dismissed with costs. The Court ruled that the RAF Act's provisions on prescription cannot override the impossibility principle, which excuses compliance with legal requirements when it is objectively impossible for the claimant to do so. The Court held that the RAF Act's prelude, which states it applies 'notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law,' does not implicitly exclude the impossibility principle, as the latter is a fundamental principle of equity and natural law, not merely a statutory provision.
• The Court upheld the appeal, setting aside the Supreme Court of Appeal's order and substituting it with a dismissal of the RAF's special plea of prescription. The decision emphasized that the RAF Act must be interpreted in accordance with the Constitution and international law, including the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). The Court concluded that the impossibility principle applies to claims under the RAF Act when claimants lack the capacity or ability to institute action, as was the case for Mr. Jacobs, who was mentally incapacitated.

Remedies

• The special plea of prescription is dismissed with costs, substituting the Supreme Court of Appeal's order.
• The respondent is ordered to pay the applicant's costs in the High Court, Supreme Court of Appeal, and Constitutional Court, with the latter including costs for two counsel.

Legal Principles

• The court applied the purposive approach to interpret the Road Accident Fund Act (RAF Act) in a manner consistent with the Constitution's Bill of Rights, prioritizing human dignity and access to courts for persons with disabilities. This included considering the socio-economic context and international obligations like the CRPD.
• The impossibility principle (lex non cogit ad impossibilia) was central to the judgment, holding that the law cannot compel individuals to perform impossible acts. This principle was invoked to suspend prescription for Mr. Jacobs, who lacked capacity to institute his claim due to mental disability.

Precedent Name

• Ex parte Speaker of the KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Legislature
• Smith N.O.
• Van Rooyen obo Motau v Road Accident Fund
• Road Accident Fund v Smith
• Moosa v Minister of Police, KwaZulu
• Telkom SA SOC Ltd v Cape Town City
• Yu Kwam
• Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit N.O.
• Standard General Insurance Co Ltd v Verdun Estates (Pty) Ltd
• Mdeyide II
• Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of Health
• Montsisi v Minister van Polisie
• Barkhuizen v Napier

Cited Statute

• Constitution of South Africa
• Prescription Act 68 of 1969
• Interpretation Act 33 of 1957
• Defence Act 44 of 1957
• Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)
• Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996

Judge Name

• Tlaletsi AJ
• Pillay AJ
• Mogoeng CJ
• Tshiqi J
• Mhlantla J
• Majiedt J
• Madlanga J
• Khampepe J
• Jafta J
• Theron J

Passage Text

• [50] Counsel for the applicant urged us to apply the common law principles that 'no one can do the impossible' and that 'prescription does not run against one who has no capacity to institute action'. Both originate in the principles of natural justice, which 'is part of the common law'.
• [143] The problem with this argument... is that it fails to explain why the impossibility principle is not expressly excluded by the phrase '[n]otwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law contained, but subject to subsections (2) and (3)'. (Emphasis added.) My Sister does not suggest that the impossibility principle is not a law or that it does not operate to the contrary of section 23, and therefore fails to explain why it does not fall within the section 23(1) exclusion.
• [114] In passing section 23, Parliament could not have intended people like Mr Jacobs to do what was impossible to perform. However, the section is under-inclusive of creditors who truly need its protection. If legislation like the RAF Act itself fails to make provision for the protection of creditors who, for circumstances beyond their control, find it impossible to institute proceedings within the fixed period, the common law comes to their rescue. This happens through the maxim lex non cogit ad impossibilia.