Macdonald V City Of Des Plaines

Key Facts

Deceased Name

Issues

• The Estate asserted a claim for excessive force against Officer Edwin Rios under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Rios's use of deadly force was unreasonable because Scott did not pose an immediate threat at the time Rios discharged his weapon. The Court denied the motion to dismiss Count V, noting that the excessive force claim is based on material extraneous to the complaint (the BWC footage) and the motion to dismiss Count V is denied as it is based on matters outside the complaint.
• The Estate claimed that the City of Des Plaines is liable under Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y. for failing to adequately train dispatchers to dispatch Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) trained officers when responders are likely to encounter someone in a mental health crisis. The Court granted the motion to dismiss Count VII, the Monell claim against the City of Des Plaines, without prejudice, finding that the Estate fails to allege a widespread practice sufficient to sustain a failure-to-train theory and cannot show deliberate indifference to a recurring, obvious risk of constitutional violation.
• The Estate alleged that the City of Des Plaines is liable based on the actions of Officer Rios under the principle of agency. The Court granted the motion to dismiss Count VI, the agency claim against the City of Des Plaines, with prejudice, finding that there is no liability under Section 1983 under an agency theory.
• In Counts I–IV, the Estate alleges that Officer Rios' conduct was willful and wanton, giving rise to wrongful death and survival claims under state law. The Court held that these state law claims survive the motion to dismiss because the Court could not address the parties' excessive force arguments based on the BWC footage, and thus the Estate's state law claims also survive the motion to dismiss.
• The Court addressed whether body-worn camera (BWC) footage from police officers could be considered when deciding the motion to dismiss. The Court held that it cannot consider evidence outside the pleadings to decide a motion to dismiss without converting it to a motion for summary judgment. Since the complaint does not reference the BWC footage and the Estate's claims do not hinge on that footage, the Court declined to consider it and denied the Estate's motion to consider the video exhibits.

Date of Death

Holdings

Remedies

• The Court denies the Estate's motion to dismiss Counts I–V, which include state law claims for wrongful death and survival against Rios, and the § 1983 excessive force claim against Rios. The Court also denies the Estate's motion to consider video exhibits. These claims survive the motion to dismiss because the Court could not address excessive force arguments based on BWC footage at the pleading stage.
• The Court grants the motion to dismiss Count VII, the Monell claim against the City of Des Plaines, without prejudice. The Court finds the Estate fails to allege a widespread practice sufficient to sustain a failure-to-train theory, as it identifies only one instance where dispatchers were not CIT trained. The dismissal is without prejudice because the Court cannot determine at this stage whether the Estate may assert a Monell claim based on failure to train.
• The Court grants the motion to dismiss Count VI, the agency claim against the City of Des Plaines, with prejudice. The Estate concedes there is no municipal liability based on agency under Section 1983, making this dismissal straightforward.

Probate Status

Legal Principles

• A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint and requires factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. The court cannot consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting to summary judgment, unless the doctrine of incorporation by reference applies (extraneous materials referred to in complaint and central to the claim). Municipal liability under Section 1983 requires that execution of a government policy or custom causes the constitutional injury, and failure-to-train claims require showing deliberate indifference to known risks of constitutional violations.
• Excessive force claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 require showing that the use of force was unreasonable and that the individual did not pose an immediate threat at the time force was used. Video evidence not referenced or attached to the complaint cannot be considered on a motion to dismiss without converting to summary judgment. State law claims for wrongful death and survival survive dismissal when federal excessive force arguments cannot be addressed due to evidentiary limitations.
• To state a Monell claim, a plaintiff must allege constitutional injury caused by (1) express policy, (2) widespread custom or practice, or (3) person with final policy-making authority, and the policy must be the moving force of the constitutional violation. A single incident can support a Monell claim where the need for training is obvious and the municipality's failure reflects deliberate indifference to recurring, obvious risks. Illinois law (50 ILCS 705/8) does not mandate training requirements for municipal liability purposes.

Precedent Name

• Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly
• Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y.
• Bohannon v. City of Indianapolis
• Ashcroft v. Iqbal
• Haligas v. City of Chicago
• Flores v. City of S. Bend

Executor Name

Cited Statute

• Civil Rights Act
• Illinois Law Enforcement Training and Standards Board
• Illinois Law Enforcement Training and Standards Board Requirements
• Illinois Law Enforcement Training and Standards Board Crisis Intervention Training Requirements
• Federal Question Jurisdiction and Removal of Cases

Executor Appointment

Judge Name

Passage Text

• In sum, the Court grants the motion to dismiss Count VII. The dismissal, however, is without prejudice, as the Court cannot say at this juncture, that the Estate may not be able to assert a Monell claim based on the failure to train.
• For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies the Estate's motion for the Court to consider the video exhibits [27] and grants in part and denies in part Defendants' motion to dismiss [8]. Specifically, it denies the motion to dismiss Counts I–V, the state law claims and § 1983 claim against Rios. It grants the motion to dismiss Count VI, the agency claim against the City of Des Plaines, with prejudice. Finally, it grants the motion to dismiss Count VII, the Monell claim against the City of Des Plaines, without prejudice.
• Here, the motion to dismiss the Estate's unreasonable seizure claim against Rios is based entirely on material extraneous to the complaint (the BWC) and, as discussed above, the parties cite no applicable exception to the rule limiting the Court's resolution of the motion to the four corners of the complaint. Since the parties do want the Court to convert the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment, the motion to dismiss Count V is denied as it is based on matters outside the complaint.