Automated Summary
Key Facts
The case Police v Joseph Stenio Cupidon (Cause No. 769/2019) resulted in a guilty verdict under section 296(a) of the Criminal Code for insult. The accused made offensive remarks to Mrs. Paquerette Cupidon (W2) on 23 February 2019 while she was hanging clothes, which were found to be abusive and insulting per se. The court found the prosecution's witness credible and determined the prosecution failed to prove the offense occurred in public, thus applying the less severe section 296(a) rather than 296(b).
Issues
- The court determined the accused's derogatory terms and insults met the legal definition of 'insult' under section 296 of the Criminal Code. Applying Dalloz's definition, the court found the words were abusive, insulting, and insulting per se without requiring factual imputation, with malicious intent presumed and unrebutted by the defense.
- The court found the prosecution failed to prove the offence was committed in public, which would have elevated the charge to section 296(b). Consequently, the conviction was upheld under the less severe section 296(a), as the publicity element was not established by the evidence.
Holdings
The court found the accused guilty of the offense of insult under section 296 (a) of the Criminal Code, as the words uttered by the accused were determined to constitute an insult in law and the defense failed to rebut the presumption of malicious intent.
Legal Principles
The court applied the legal principle that the offense of insult requires malicious intent, which is presumed for abusive language uttered in a manner that is injurious per se. The defense failed to rebut this presumption, leading to the conviction under section 296(a) of the Criminal Code.
Precedent Name
Carpen v The State
Cited Statute
Criminal Code
Judge Name
D.J.A Dangeot
Passage Text
- 15. "....the offence of insult by means of words consists in the use of abusive language not carrying with it an imputation of fact. The requisite mens rea is a malicious intent which is however presumed in expressions which are injurious or offensive per se «jusqu'à ce que l'auteur du propos eût prouvé qu'il ne voulait pas injurier la personne à laquelle il l'a adressée» - Morel v. Couve [1912 MR 78]."
- 13. Relying on the French authorities and after having analysed the words uttered by Accused, I am of the view that those words uttered constitute an insult in law.
- 10. Insult is defined in Dalloz, Repertoire de Droit Pénal et de Procedure Pénale (2e edition) as: "toute expression outrageante, terme de mépris ou invective qui ne renferme l'imputation d'aucun fait détermine".