Automated Summary
Key Facts
Dodzie Sabbah was arrested in January 1993 and charged with conspiracy to murder and murder of Amegbor Amedorme. He was convicted by a jury in the Accra High Court in August 2001 and sentenced to death. His conviction was overturned by the Court of Appeal in January 2004 due to misdirection by the trial judge. Sabbah applied for compensation under Article 14(7) of the 1992 Constitution, but the Court of Appeal dismissed his request, asserting that his arrest, trial, and conviction were lawful. The Supreme Court later ruled in Sabbah v The Republic (2009) that he was completely innocent of the charges, as no evidence linked him to the crime. The case now centers on whether compensation is mandatory or discretionary under Article 14(7) following wrongful conviction and acquittal.
Issues
- The first key issue is the true and proper construction of Article 14(7) of the 1992 Constitution, specifically whether the duty to issue a certificate recommending compensation for an acquitted person is mandatory or discretionary. The Appellant argues that the provision is mandatory, while the Court of Appeal and Respondent contend it is discretionary.
- The second issue centers on whether the fundamental abuse of the Appellant's rights occurred at the moment of his arrest and detention without legal cause, rendering all subsequent legal processes nugatory. The Appellant claims his arrest was unlawful, while the Respondent asserts the trial and conviction were lawful.
Holdings
- Justice Adinyira affirmed the discretionary nature of Article 14(7) but emphasized the appellant's innocence and the systemic failure in his wrongful conviction. The Court of Appeal's reliance on procedural regularity was rejected, as the fundamental human rights violation necessitated compensation.
- Justice Benin concluded that the discretionary power under Article 14(7) requires courts to assess whether the prosecution was without reasonable cause. The absence of evidence linking the appellant to the crime and the Court of Appeal's incomplete record review justified compensation.
- The Chief Justice (Wood) held that Article 14(7) of the 1992 Constitution confers discretionary power on courts to certify compensation for wrongful conviction. The Court of Appeal's dismissal was reversed because the appellant was completely innocent, and his prosecution was without reasonable cause. Compensation was awarded as a discretionary remedy for the grave miscarriage of justice.
- Justice Akamba upheld the discretionary interpretation of Article 14(7) but found the prosecution of the appellant was unlawful. The Court of Appeal's decision was overturned due to its failure to recognize the absence of reasonable grounds for the initial arrest and conviction.
- Justice Dotse agreed that Article 14(7) allows discretion but found the prosecution of the appellant was reckless and without reasonable cause. The Court of Appeal's failure to consider the appellant's complete innocence led to the appeal's success.
Remedies
The Supreme Court awarded the appellant GH¢35,000.00 (Thirty Five Thousand Ghana Cedis) as compensation for his wrongful conviction and imprisonment. This compensation was determined based on the fundamental breach of his human rights to personal liberty, including the trauma of serving a death sentence for 2 years and 7 months on death row, as well as 8 years in remand custody for an offence he did not commit. The court emphasized that the award was not punitive but a reasonable sum to address the non-pecuniary losses suffered, such as mental anguish, loss of freedom, and damage to reputation.
Monetary Damages
35000.00
Legal Principles
- Compensation under Article 14(7) is discretionary, not mandatory, as the use of 'may' in the constitutional text grants courts the authority to consider all circumstances before recommending or awarding compensation.
- The court emphasized a purposive interpretation of the 1992 Constitution, particularly Article 14(7), to ensure the provision aligns with its intended goals of compensating wrongfully convicted individuals while considering the broader constitutional framework and societal context.
Precedent Name
- Tuffuor v Attorney-General
- Adjei-Ampofo v Attorney-General
- National Media Commission v Attorney General
- Kuenyehia v Archer
- Republic v Fast Track High Court; Ex parte Daniel
- Danso-Acheampong v Attorney-General
- Egbetorworkpor v Republic
- Awuni v West African Examinations Council
- Attorney–General (No 2) v Tsatsu Tsikata (No 2)
- Asare v Attorney–General
Cited Statute
- Courts Act, 1993 (Act 459)
- Criminal and Other Offences Procedure Act, 1960 (Act 30)
- Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 (UK)
- Interpretation Act, 2009
- 1992 Constitution
- Criminal Justice Act 1988 (UK)
Judge Name
- ADINYIRA (MRS.)
- AKAMBA
- BENIN
- WOOD (MRS.)
- DOTSE
Passage Text
- The justices highlighted the need for a case-by-case assessment of compensation, considering factors like the nature of the offense, duration of incarceration, and systemic failures in the justice system. '...the Supreme Court must set guidelines reflecting the court's appreciation of the value in money terms of the freedoms and personal liberties of citizens...'
- The court concluded that the appellant's acquittal on appeal demonstrated a 'gross miscarriage of justice' due to his complete innocence. '...the appellant was completely innocent of the charge of murder and his acquittal by the Court of Appeal raises the presumption of the unlawfulness of his conviction...'
- The court emphasized that the use of the word 'may' in Article 14(7) indicates discretionary power, not a mandatory obligation. '...the word 'may' ought to be construed as permissive and empowering, rather than mandatory or imperative...'